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RECIPROCAL RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN COUNTRY
MONEY JUDGMENTS: THE CANADA-UNITED
STATES EXAMPLE
I. INTRODUCTION
Picture an American' family vacationing near the Canadian border in the
Thousand Islands section of northern New York State. While driving through
the beautiful countryside along highway 12, their automobile is suddenly
struck from behind by another car. Unfortunately for this mythical family,
the mishap caused some serious injuries and destroyed their car, not to
mention their vacation. Bad luck, yes, but if the driver of the vehicle at fault
happened to be a citizen of nearby Canada, protected by an insurer with no
assets in the United States, the family's misfortune has just begun.
An American judgment obtained against the negligent Canadian driver,
under most circumstances, will go unrecognized by the courts of Canada 2 and
will be unenforceable against the driver's Canadian assets.3 The family could
obtain no redress against the negligent Canadian through a United States
judgment, 4 This result would follow even if the defendant were to be duly
served in Canada under a constitutionally valid long-arm statute.5 Yet if the
accident occurred just over the International Bridge in Ontario, and was due
1. In this comment the adjective "American" will pertain solely to the United States.
2. In most cases the American court issuing the judgment lacks personal jurisdiction over the
defendant sufficient for recognition in Canada. See text accompanying notes 29-30 infra. Under
some circumstances, however, the United States court's jurisdiction will be adequate. See note 58
infra and accompanying text. Hence, if the other requisites outlined in part II infra are satisfied,
recognition may be given by the Canadian court.
3. See part II infra.
4. Of course, the American family could take the matter up in Canada, but if the accident
happened on American soil, this might place an unfair burden on them. A New York forum
probably would be more convenient to the plaintiff and to the witnesses. Though possibly
inconvenient to the defendant, he has chosen to make "contacts" within the state. The problem Is
not, however, in obtaining a local forum which has jurisdiction to hear the action. See, e.g.,
Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967); Selder v.
Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966) (local forum provided even where
defendant has little or no "contact" with it). Rather, the dilemma is in persuading a Canadian
court to recognize the judgment of the local tribunal. Similar judgments of local forums are
routinely recognized by sister states through the full faith and credit clause. The considerations
are much simpler, however, where the litigation is interstate rather than international. For one
thing, litigation within the United States is ultimately under the auspices of the Constitution and
the Supreme Court. The situation is different with a judgment brought from one country to the
other. The decree is influenced by two legal systems having no common overseer. This factor
should not be minimized. Nonetheless, looked at merely in terms of litigational convenience and
fairness to the parties, the ideal should be to ensure recognition of a judgment of a local forum
awarded to an American citizen involved in international litigation, and arising from a tort
committed in, or resulting from other sufficient minimum contact with, a state of the United
States.
S. See notes 58-87 infra and accompanying text.
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to the negligence of the American driver, a Canadian lawyer would have far
less trouble gaining recognition and enforcement6 of his Canadian judgment
by the courts of the United States.7
This dichotomy8 is faced by American citizens, and their attorneys, in all
their dealings with Canadians. These dealings, primarily taking the form of
trade and travel, are increasing at accelerating rates. 9 As contacts between the
nations become more frequent, so will litigation. Thus, it is highly desirable to
create and to maintain dependable methods for foreign execution of each
country's judgments, so as to help keep harmonious the ever-increasing
6. The phrase "recognition and enforcement" is redundant. This is because "recognition" of
an extranational judgment by the home country's tribunal is accomplished either by "enforce-
ment" of the judgment or by treating it as "res judicata." A. Ehrenzweig, A Treatise on the
Conflict of Laws § 61, at 215 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Ehrenzweig. See also Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 117, comment c (1971), where the distinction is utilized.
Enforcement is generally effected by obtaining a new judgment in the country where execution is
sought. Ehrenzweig, supra at 216. See also text accompanying note 24 infra and note 127 infra
and accompanying text- Of course, if there are no assets, there may be no enforcement. A
judgment is deemed to be res judicata when a court of the home country refuses to retry a cause
of action already litigated before a foreign tribunal. Ehrenzweig, supra at 216. "International res
judicata" is perhaps a more accurate term in the context of extranational judgments. See Smit,
International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United States, 9 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 44
(1962) [hereinafter cited as Smit].
This Comment will use the term "recognition" to mean either the enforcement of a judgment
(the usual means of recognition of a foreign country money judgment) or the treatment of the
judgment as res judicata.
7. See part III infra. The situation has been otherwise described. See J.-G. Castel, Private
International Law 257-58 (1960) ("American and Canadian courts are quite liberal with regard to
each other's judgments. . . "). Such a description should be read with caution. Compare id. with,
e.g., Castel, Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments in the Province of Quebec, 21 Revue du
Barreau de la Province de Quebec 128, 129 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Quebec Judgments] ( In
the common-law provinces . . . the rules prevailing there are more generous [than those in
Quebec] although by no means liberal.").
8. There are several reasons for the disparity, but the most important is the difference in the
two nations' views on the subject of personal jurisdiction. See text accompanying notes 29-30
infra.
9. Several illustrative statistics reveal the extent of the rise in interaction between the
countries. In trade, United States exports of merchandise to Canada increased during the decade
1960-1970 from about $3.8 billion to about $9.1 billion, and further increased to about $19.9
billion in 1974. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1975, at 814
(96th ed. 1975). Imports of merchandise increased during the same decade from approximately
S2.9 billion to approximately $11.1 billion, and rose to approximately $22.3 billion in 1974. Id. Of
course, inflation accounts for part of the increase. In all, about two-thirds of Canada's foreign
trade is with the United States. Cohen, Canada and the United States-Possibilities for the
Future, 12 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 196, 198-99 (1973).
Travel expenditures have also greatly increased. In 1965 United States residents spent about
$600 million in Canada while travelling there. By 1974 the amount had more than doubled to
over $1.3 billion. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1975, at
219 (96th ed. 1975) (1974 figures are preliminary). During the same 1965-1974 period, expendi-
tures by Canadians travelling in the United States rose from about $490 million to over $1.2
billion. Id.
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contacts between their peoples. Yet, recognition by each nation of the other's
judgments has been uneven and, particularly in the case of Canadian recogni-
tion of United States' judgments, often nonexistent.
Moreover, the Canada-United States example, while the focus of this
Comment, 10 is hardly unique. Throughout the world, similar situations exist
where foreign courts refuse to recognize United States federal and state money
judgments." This lack of credit persists even in the face of commendable
generosity on the part of United States courts in recognizing and enforcing
money judgments of these same countries. 12
The goal of this Comment is to examine the Canadian and American
systems of foreign country money judgment recognition, their similarities and
10. The subject matter of this Comment, recognition of foreign country money judgments, is
but a subsection of the discipline known as private international law. This term is a British
expression for that branch of law known as conflict of laws in the United States. It is defined as
"that part of law which comes into play when the issue before the court affects some fact, event
or transaction that is so closely connected with a foreign system of law as to necessitate recourse
to that system." P. North, Cheshire's Private International Law 5 (9th ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited
as Cheshire]; see J.-G. Castel, Canadian Conflict of Laws 4-5 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Canadian Conflicts].
The discipline deals with disputes of a private nature, though one of the parties may be it
sovereign state. As such, it is to be distinguished from public international law, which primarily
governs relations between nations. Cheshire, supra at 13.
While the scope of this Comment is confined to money judgments, wherever appropriate,
authority is drawn from cases and other sources involving non-monetary decrees. The usual
instance is where there is no case on point involving a money judgment, and the principle taken
from the other type of case is of universal application.
11. See Nadelmann, Non-Recognition of American Money Judgments Abroad and What to
Do About It, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 236 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Non-Recognition].
12. These actions by American courts are both commendable and generous because, it would
seem, the natural human reaction is not to recognize, but to deny recognition to judgments of
non-cooperating countries through the doctrine of reciprocity.
Reciprocity or, as the doctrine is sometimes unflatteringly referred to, retorsion, reflects the
natural desire to return to another person (or country) the same character of treatment received.
Cf. A. Ehrenzweig, Psychoanalytic Jurisprudence 164 (1971), where the author posits that the
whole field of private international law could be better understood, and its destiny better charted,
if examined from a psychological viewpoint. See generally Lenhoff, Reciprocity: The Legal
Aspect of a Perennial Idea, 49 Nw. U.L. Rev. 619 & 752 (1954-1955).
Under the doctrine of reciprocity, if, for example, Austria refuses to recognize Canada's
judgments, Canada would refuse to recognize Austria's judgments. The doctrine has been
roundly criticized by commentators as, at best, counterproductive. E.g., Smit, supra note 6, at
49-50 & n.39 (1962). Despite the criticism, however, the principle is sufficiently entrenched in the
human psyche to remain the law of such nations as Austria and Germany. Herzog, International
Law, National Tribunals and the Rights of Aliens: The West European Experience, 21 Vand. L.
Rev. 742, 750-51, 754-55 (1968) (non-matrimonial cases).
It has also been pronounced the law of the United States by the Supreme Court, at least in
certain cases. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 227-28 (1895); notes 137-60 & 211-14 infra and
accompanying text; cf. United States v. United Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164 (1976)
(suits by foreign nationals in cases involving a public vessel of the United States barred unless
their governments reciprocate by allowing similar suits by United States nationals).
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their disparities. The emphasis is upon the elements and procedures necessary
to present effectively a judgment for recognition in the courts of each nation.
Thus, the discussion begins with an outline of the traditional Canadian
common-law rules, then turns to the modifications made by statute. Next
follows a summary of the corresponding American precedents and statutory
restatement. A detailed comparison will be made between the Canadian and
American uniform acts on this subject. In addition, throughout this Com-
ment, aspects of the two systems will be compared, the objective being to
illustrate that, while the present situation calls for improvement, the com-
patibility of the two legal systems provides cause for optimism.
11. CANADIAN RECOGNITION OF UNITED STATES JUDGMENTS
13
As a starting point it should be noted that recognition of foreign country
judgments is a matter of Canadian provincial, not federal, law.' 4 The
Constitution of Canada is construed as providing for this treatment.' 5 The
provincial courts, with the exception of those of Quebec, 16 apply principles of
13. See generally Castel, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Personamn
and in Rem in the Common Law Provinces of Canada, 17 McGill L.J. 11 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Recognition]. No attempt is made in this section to duplicate the scope of the extensive Castel
article. The purposes of this section are to summarize Canadian law on this subject, to outline the
law in convenient format, to discuss new material that has arisen since 1971, and to present an
American view of the subject.
14. J.-G. Castel, Private International Law 258 (1960). The Canadian practice is similar to
that in the United States. State law generally controls unless a federal question is involved. See
notes 178-79 infra and accompanying text.
There is full acknowledgment of the right of a nation, in an action seeking its recognition of a
foreign country judgment, to decide the case according to its own conflict of laws rules. E.g.,
Reese, The Status in This Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 783, 786
(1950) [hereinafter cited as Reese].
15. British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, § 92(14). See also Recognition,
supra note 12, at 132. This legislation of the British Parliament, as amended, is the Constitution
of Canada, Rand, Some Aspects of Canadian Constitutionalism, 38 Can. B. Rev. 135, 137-38
(1960), although the present Canadian government is pledged to develop a Constitution written
by Canadians. See N.Y. Times, February 23, 1977, at A-6, col. 6. The Statute of Westminster,
1931, 22 Geo. 5, c. 4, is thought of as an additional component of the Canadian Constitution.
Rand, supra at 137-38. The statute provides, in partinent part, that, after the date of enactment,
no act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom shall extend to Canada. The Statute of
Westminster, 1931, 22 Geo. 5, c. 4.
While cases involving foreign country money judgments are first heard in provincial courts,
appeal often lies to the Supreme Court of Canada. Litigants may appeal to that Court as of right
from any final judgment of the highest court of a province, provided that the issue is not solely
one of fact and that the amount in controversy exceeds ten thousand dollars. Can. Rev. Stat. c.
44, § 1 (1st Supp. 1970). See also J. Lyon & R. Atkey, Canadian Constitutional Law in a Modern
Perspective 279 (1970). The Supreme Court is the court of last resort in Canada. Its judgments
are final and conclusive, for appeal may no longer be taken to the Privy Council in Britain.
16. Quebec has been influenced by the legal systems of both France and England, the
influence resulting in a unique combination of civil and common law. The differences between
the rules of foreign money judgment recognition in Quebec and in the common-law provinces are
not fundamental. Quebec Judgments, supra note 7, at 143. It should be noted, however, that the
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English common law. 17 As a result, their approaches to this subject are quite
similar.
As with recognition of judgments from foreign countries, recognition of
judgments from other Canadian provinces is wholly a matter of the law of the
enforcing province. The same precedents control in both interprovincial and
international litigation.' 8 This is because, for purposes of recognition, each
province is considered a separate foreign country. 19 Persons with judgments
from one province traditionally have had to relitigate in the other province, 20
major variances occur in two crucial areas: personal jurisdiction and conclusiveness of the foreign
court's judgment. Id. at 131. See generally Johnson, Foreign Judgments in Quebec, 35 Can. B.
Rev. 911 (1957). The Quebec rules of judgment recognition are outside the scope of this
Comment.
17. Of course, the common law is superseded when the point is governed by statute. The two
territories of Canada, the Yukon and Northwest Territories, also apply English common law.
Throughout this Comment, unless otherwise stated, "provinces" should be read to include the
territories.
18. E.g., Gyonyor v. Sanjenko, 23 D.L.R.3d 695 (Alta. Sup. Ct. 1971) (Montana judgment
not recognized; cases involving Quebec judgments cited as controlling).
19. H. Read, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the Common Law Units
of the British Commonwealth 12-13 (1938) [hereinafter cited as Read]. "The provinces of Canada
are separate law districts and the judgments of the courts of each are foreign to those of each of
the others . . . ." Id. at 13.
20. This difficulty has been mitigated through passage by most of the provinces of versions of
the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, formulated by the Conference of Commissioners
on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada. See parts II-B, IV infra. The name of the body has been
changed to the Uniform Law Conference of Canada. For a description of the work of the
Conference, see MacTavish, Uniformity of Legislation in Canada-An Outline, 25 Can. B. Rev.
36, 47-52 (1947).
The act has facilitated interprovincial lawsuits by eliminating in many cases the need for
relitigation. "The Legislature's clear and commendable intention in enacting the Reciprocal
Enforcement of Judgments Act was to [avoid] . . . having to sue upon the foreign judgment or
relitigate the cause of action in the Manitoba Courts." Re Aero Trades Western Ltd. and Ben
Hocum & Son Ltd., 51 D.L.R.3d 617, 620 (Man. County Ct. 1974) (italics omitted) (registration
and enforcement granted without a trial de novo despite defendant's attempt to raise two defenses
and one counterclaim which could have been raised in the original action). Compare id. with Re
Gacs and Maierovitz, 68 D.L.R.2d 345, 350-51 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1968) (registration denied because,
under common-law principles, the recognizing court re-examined the merits and found "manifest
error" in the judgment) and Traders Group Ltd. v. Hopkins, 69 D.L.R.2d 250, 254 (Nw. Terr.
Terr. Ct. 1968), aff'd, I D.L.R.3d 416 (Nw. Terr. 1968) (registration denied because jurisdiction
of the adjudicating court, although sufficient under its long-arm statute, was insufficient under
the common law). It has not, however, changed the conception of provinces as separate law
districts. This is because "[tihe [Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments] Act does not make the
judgments to which the Act applies any less 'foreign' judgments or any more directly enforceable
than before the Act was passed." Can. Credit Men's Trust Ass'n, Ltd. v. Ryan, [1930] 1 D.L.R.
280, 282 (Alta. Sup. Ct. 1929); accord, Re Kenny, [1951] 2 D.L.R. 98, 105 (Ont.). See also J.-G.
Castel, Private International Law 258 (1960).
Nor has it altered the use of a common set of precedent in both interprovincial and
1977] FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS 1461
under this common body of case law, because the Constitution of Canada has
no counterpart to the full faith and credit clause.
Turning to the precepts governing recognition of foreign country judg-
ments, Canadian provinces are in accord with commentators in recognizing
that the acts and judicial decrees of one sovereign are ineffective outside its
borders. 2 1 In essence, this means that neither American federal nor state
money judgments have any direct influence upon persons or property situated
in Canada;22 nor are such pronouncements entitled to automatic recognition
and enforcement by the courts of the provinces.2 3 Instead, to be recognized,
American judgments must be sued upon in a Canadian enforcement action, or
raised as res judicata in a Canadian action readjudicating the same rights. z4
In either case, whether a Canadian court will recognize a United States
money judgment will depend upon rules of the common law. 25 This is the
situation even under the Canadian judgment enforcement statutes, which
have not fundamentally altered the common law. 26 Under the common-law
rules, the foreign court must have jurisdiction, the judgment must be final, it
must be for a definite or easily ascertainable sum, it must be untainted by
international recognition actions. See, e.g. Wedlay v. Quist, [1953] 4 D.L.R. 620, 624 (Alta.)
(interprovincial action under Act, decided under precedents involving international litigation).
21. Compare, e.g., Yntema, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Anglo-American
Law, 33 Mich. L. Rev. 1129, 1142-44 (1935) and Recognition, supra note 12, at 13, with
McGuire v. McGuire, [1953] 2 D.L.R. 394, 397 (Ont.) (divorce action) and Assiniboia Land Co.
v. Acres, 28 D.L.R. 364, 366 (Ont. Sup. Ct. 1916) (dictum). But see Stevenson, "Extraterritorial-
ity" in Canadian-United States Relations, 63 Dep't State Bull. 425 (1970), where the author
asserts that, because of the doseness of our modern world, it is inevitable that certain exercises of
jurisdiction have some extraterritorial effect.
22. J.-G. Castel, Private International Law 257 (1960); cf. Chassy v. MLay, 68 D.L.R. 427
(Can. 1921). While there was no money judgment at issue in Chassy, the court held that the
Washington court's declaratory judgment could have no direct effect upon British Columbia
lands. Id. at 429.
23. See Frederick A. Jones, Inc. v. Toronto Gen. Ins. Co., [1933] 2 D.L.R. 660, 667-68 (Ont.)
(Masten, J.A.).
24. See note 6 supra.
25. There are no treaty provisions covering recognition of extranational judgments in
existence between the two nations. U.S. Dep't of State, Pub. No. 8847, Treaties in Force on
January 1, 1976 (1976); Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Hall, 367 F. Supp. 1009, 1011 (E.D. Ark.
1973).
There are several theories as to why Canadian courts, following common-law rules, recognize
foreign judgments at all. Comity, reciprocity, legal obligation, vested rights, or res judicata may
be the motivating force. Recognition, supra note 13, at 13-25. Whichever is the true rationale,
however, and there may be several, it is presently inscrutable. Terms such as comity and res
judicata appear far more infrequently in Canadian cases than in American cases. Perhaps this is
because English common law has long ago been settled in this area. See, e.g., the cases cited in
notes 27, 32, 34 & 88 infra. By the process of stare decisis, various hard rules have endured.
Today, in many cases, the rules themselves, not the doctrines of, for example, comity or res
judicata, are the basis for decision.
26. See note 20 supra.
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fraud, and the proceedings must not offend Canadian notions of natural
justice.
A. Canadian Common Law of Foreign Money Judgment
Recognition
1. The Foreign Court Must Have Had Jurisdiction
In the provinces, the modern interpretation of this requirement stems from a
nineteenth century English chancery decision, Pemberton v. Hughes.27 The
principle derived from this case is that a judgment of a foreign court will be
recognized if the court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties.2 8
While lack of subject matter jurisdiction usually poses little problem to the
party seeking recognition of the judgment, the question of adequate jurisdic-
tion over the person is a major hurdle. The courts of Canada and those of the
United States implement the requirement of personal jurisdiction in vastly
different ways. 29 In fact, different rules of personal jurisdiction account for
the major disparity in the frequency of recognition of extranational judgments
by courts of the two nations. 30
a. Predicates of Jurisdiction
In Pemberton, the English court recognized a Florida divorce decree only
because the state court had jurisdiction in the international sense.3" The
concept has been clearly defined. For a foreign court to possess jurisdiction in
the international sense, it must have territorial jurisdiction over the defen-
dant.32
The requirement continues to apply in Canada. 33 Provincial courts define
27. [1899] 1 Ch. 781 (C.A.).
28. Id. at 790-91. The court also imposed the requirements that the judgment be final, and
that it not offend English notions of substantial justice. Id; see notes 88-93 & 101 infra and
accompanying text. Since the foreign court had personal and subject matter jurisdiction, and the
judgment was final and in accord with English notions of substantial justice, the court did not
inquire whether the jurisdiction was properly exercised under the foreign court's own law. Id,
Although Pemberton involved a judgment in rem, its principles have been reaffirmed by
Canadian courts in cases involving money judgments rendered in personam. E.g., Re Guildhall
Ins. Co. and Jackson, 69 D.L.R.2d 137, 141 (Alta. Sup. Ct. 1968); Wigston v. Chowen, 48
D.L.R.2d 155, 159-60 (Sask. Q.B. 1964). Pemberton has also recently been reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court of Canada in a matrimonial action. Powell v. Cockburn, 68 D.L.R.3d 700,
709-10 (Can. 1976) (Dickson, J.).
29. Compare the following discussion of Canadian jurisdictional rules with the discussion of
American jurisdiction at notes 165-77 infra and accompanying text.
30. This disparity of treatment was alluded to earlier in part I.
31. "[T]he jurisdiction which alone is important in these matters is the competence of the
[foreign] Court in an international sense-i.e., its territorial competence ... over the defendant."
[18991 1 Ch. at 791 (Lindey, M.R.). See also Cheshire, supra note 10, at 632-33.
32. Sirdar Gurdyal Singh v. Rajah of Faridkote, [1894] A.C. 670, 683 (P.C.) (Punjab). In fact,
a judgment rendered by a court lacking territorial jurisdiction over the person "is by international
law an absolute nullity." Id. at 684.
33. See, e.g., Moran v. Pyle Nat'l (Canada) Ltd., 43 D.L.R.3d 239, 242 (Can. 1973); Mattar
v. Public Trustee, [1952] 3 D.L.R. 399, 401-02 (Alta.) (Frank Ford, J.A.) (dictum); Gyonyor v.
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territorial jurisdiction by looking to dictum from a lasting English decision,
Emanuel v. Symon. 34 According to rules outlined in this case and adhered to
by Canadian courts, 35 a provincial court would find that the foreign tribunal
enjoyed territorial jurisdiction over the defendant in five circumstances: 36 (1)
where the defendant was a citizen of the foreign country in which the
judgment was obtained;37 (2) where he was a resident of, or in some way
present in, the foreign jurisdiction when the action began;38 (3) where he in
some manner selected the forum either as claimant or counterclaimant; 39 (4)
where he voluntarily appeared in the foreign court;4" or (5) where he in some
Sanjenko, 23 D.L.R.3d 695, 697-98 (Alta. Sup. Ct. 1971); Bodnar v. Popovich, [197413 W.W.R.
658, 661-62 (Alta. Dist. Ct. 1973); Re Kenny, [1951] 2 D.L.R. 98, 10S (Ont.). This notion that
territorial jurisdiction is essential is also expressed in Pemberton v. Hughes, [18991 1 Ch. 781, 791
(C.A.) (Lindley, M.R.); see cases cited in note 28 supra. See also Cheshire supra note 10, at 643
34. [1908] 1 K.B. 302 (C.A. 1907).
35. See, e.g., Mattar v. Public Trustee, [1952] 3 D.L.R. 399, 403 (Alta.) (Macdonald, J.A.);
Gyonyor v. Sanjenko, 23 D.L.R.3d 695, 696-97 (Alta. Sup. CL 1971); Webster v. Connors Bros.
Ltd., [1935] 2 D.L.R. 483, 486-87 (N.B.K.B.).
36. Emanuel v. Symon [1908] 1 K.B. 302, 309 (dictum of Buckley, L.J.).
37. See, e.g., Marshall v. Houghton, [1923] 2 W.W.R. 553 (Man.).
38. In Emanuel v. Symon the court referred only to "residence." [19081 1 K.B. 302, 309 (C.A.
1907) (dictum of Buckley, L.J.). It is clear, however, that the court actually referred to three
degrees of presence: physical presence, residence and domicile. See Recognition, supra note 13, at
34-37. Thus, as to physical presence, it has been held that territorial jurisdiction is acquired even
where the defendant is served while merely passing through the forum on a casual visit. Forbes v.
Simmons, 20 D.L.R. 100 (Alta. Sup. Ct. 1914). The only limitation on physical presence is where
the defendant is fraudulently induced to enter the jurisdiction for the purpose of being served. See
1 W. Williston & R. Rolls, The Law of Civil Procedure [Canada] 2 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Williston & Rolls].
When defendant is served outside the forum, pursuant to its jurisdictional statutes, the fact
that he was once or twice physically present in the forum in the past will not move Canadian
courts to acknowledge the statutory jurisdiction. Rather, for the foreign court to have territorial
jurisdiction, a defendant served outside the forum must be a resident of that forum at time of
service. See, e.g., Mattar v. Public Trustee, [1952] 3 D.L.R. 399, 404 (AIta.) (Macdonald, J.A.),
Belcourt v. Noel, 9 D.L.R. 788 (Alta. Sup. CL 1913); Read & Co. v. Ferguson, 8 D.L.R. 737,
739 (Sask. Sup. Ct. 1912) (dictum); Recognition, supra note 13, at 36.
For the Canadian definition of residence, which is essentially identical to the American, see
Williston & Rolls, supra at 333-37. It is possible to have dual residency. Id. at 333-34. See also
Frederick A. Jones, Inc. v. Toronto Gen. Ins. Co., [1933] 2 D.L.R. 660, 669 (Ont.) (Masten,
J.A.) (territorial jurisdiction over a corporation exists where it does business, or has an agent
doing business on a steady basis).
Although domicile is specified as one of the degrees of presence acceptable to Canadian courts
where defendant is served outside the forum, some cases dispute this, presumably because
domicile is difficult to ascertain. Mattar v. Public Trustee, [19521 3 D.L.R. 399, 400 (Alta.)
(Frank Ford, J.A.); Recognition, supra note 13, at 36-37.
39. See Burnfiel v. Burnfiel, [1925] 3 D.L.R. 935, 939 (Sask. K.B.), rev'd on other grounds,
[1926] 2 D.L.R. 129 (Sask. C.A.); Recognition, supra note 13, at 37-38. See generally Annot-,
Consent as a Basis of Jurisdiction in Personam of a Foreign Court, [1931] 1 D.L.R. 1 [hereinafter
cited as Canadian Annotation].
40. There are three possibilities of submission by voluntary appearance to the jurisdiction of a
foreign court. These are where the defendant appears and pleads to the merits without raising
lack of jurisdiction, where he appears and pleads to the merits notwithstanding his defense of
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way agreed in advance to submit himself to the authority of the forum. 4 1
While these requirements may not seem unduly demanding, analysis re-
veals that most United States judgments would fail to fulfill them. For example,
lack of jurisdiction, and where he appears solely to contest jurisdiction. Recognition, supra note
13, at 38. In the first of these instances there is general agreement that the defendant has
submitted, and that the resulting judgment should be recognized in Canada. See Read, supra
note 19, at 165. Recent Ontario cases indicate that, in the second instance, answering the
complaint and thereby pleading to the merits is submission to the foreign court, even in the face
of a defense of lack of jurisdiction. Bank of Bermuda Ltd. v. Stutz, [1965] 2 Ont. 121 (High Ct.);
First Nat'l Bank of Ore. v. Harris, 10 Ont. 2d 516 (Sup. Ct. 1975). In the latter situation, the
defendant has not submitted to the authority of the foreign court. Recognition, supra note 13, at
42.
In each case, the issue of submission is one of fact to be resolved by the Canadian court when
recognition is sought. Mattar v. Public Trustee, [1952] 3 D.L.R. 399, 403 (Alta.) (Macdonald,
J.A.); Richardson v. Allen, 28 D.L.R. 134, 135 (Alta. 1916) (defending the merits after losing
jurisdictional challenge found as a fact to be submission to the foreign court); see Esdale v. Bank
of Ottawa, 51 D.L.R. 485 (Alta. 1920) (mere offer to appear in foreign court for express purpose
of annulling previous default judgment found as a fact not to be submission).
41. Clauses within valid contracts binding both parties to take proceedings in the courts of a
particular law district are effective to confer jurisdiction on the selected courts, even though such
courts otherwise lack in personam jurisdiction. See, e.g., Mattar v. Public Trustee, (1952] 3
D.L.R. 399, 401 (Alta.) (Frank Ford, J.A.); Gyonyor v. Sanjenko, 23 D.L.R.3d 695 (Alta. Sup.
Ct. 1971); Hughes v. Sharp, 70 D.L.R.2d 298 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 5
D.L.R.3d 760 (B.C. 1969) (confession of judgment made pursuant to cognovit recognized by
British Columbia court); Harbican v. Kennedy, [1937] 2 D.L.R. 541 (Man. K.B.); E.K. Motors
Ltd. v. Volkswagen Canada Ltd., [1973] 1 W.W.R. 466 (Sask. 1972).
Whether there is an agreement to submit, written or oral, is a question of fact. Mattar v. Public
Trustee [1952] 3 D.L.R. 399, 403-04 (Macdonald, J.A.). No agreement is implied in law, see id.,
but the parties may expressly agree or, by their conduct, may give rise to an implication that they
intend to be contractually bound to the authority of a foreign court. Canadian Annotation, supra
note 39, at 12; Recognition, supra note 13, at 43; see notes 54-57 infra and accompanying text.
Two forms of conduct which are insufficient to confer jurisdiction cognizable in Canada upon a
foreign court are particularly important due to the proximity of the two nations. One is mere
ownership of property in a foreign country. Recognition, supra note 13, at 32. Of course, the
Canadian court can do nothing to prevent the foreign tribunal from executing the in personam
judgment against the foreign land. Id. The second is entrance into a contract in a foreign country
to be performed there, or affecting property there. See id. at 44.
A related question, although separate from the matter of recognition of foreign country
judgments, is whether a Canadian court should decline to exercise jurisdiction in a case where the
parties to the controversy have contractually agreed to submit their disputes to a specified foreign
court. The issue arises when one of the parties chooses to litigate in Canada, notwithstanding his
previous agreement to sue elsewhere. Canadian courts have the common-law power to exercise
jurisdiction regardless of any agreement between the parties, provided, of course, the matter falls
within the Canadian court's own rules of personal and subject matter jurisdiction. Canadian
Conflicts, supra note 10, at 314.
In essence, the court may rewrite the parties' agreement, without regard to their earlier intent,
at least where the agreement is not crystal clear on the point. See, e.g., A.S. May & Co. v. Robert
Reford Co., 6 D.L.R.3d 289 (Ont. High Ct. 1969) (finding Ontario the forum of convenience,
notwithstanding agreement that disputes be litigated in Yugoslavia; also finding defendant had
submitted to the jurisdiction of Ontario courts). See generally Cowen & Mendes da Costa, The
Contractural Forum-A Comparative Study, 43 Can. B. Rev. 453 (1965).
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the first circumstance above, the general rule acknowledging national citizen-
ship as a valid jurisdictional base, appears to represent an opportunity for a
United States judgment creditor to gain recognition of his judgment in the
case of a defendant who, while still a United States citizen, lives or has assets
in Canada. It would seem that a judgment obtained in any American court
against a United States citizen would be capable of recognition in Canada.
Judgments from the United States are, however, exceptions to this general
rule. 42 In Canada, it has been held that an American citizen is a citizen only
of the United States, and not of any state, unless the person at the time of
service resides in that state. 43 Thus, Canadian courts define citizenship of an
American state as residence of the state." Territorial jurisdiction asserted on
the basis of United States citizenship does not exist unless the defendant is a
resident of the forum state at the time suit is brought.4 s Accordingly, in the
42. The exception to the general rule would hold true in the case of any other nation
possessing dual federal-state court systems. Canada is just such a nation.
43. Dakota Lumber Co. v. Rinderknecht, 2 West. L.R. (Can.) 275 (Nw. Terr. 1905). The
reason for the special rule is that in a federal system such as that of the United States, an
independent source of substantive rights is state law. See id. at 276; Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,
326 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1945). In addition, each state operates under a separate legal system. Thus,
to the issue of jurisdiction based upon allegiance, state citizenship is far more relevant than is
national citizenship, at least in cases where state substantive rights are involved. See Dakota
Lumber Co. v. Rinderknecht, 2 West. L.R. (Can.) 275 (Nw. Terr. 1905). In other cases, where
federal substantive rights are involved, it can be argued that national citizenship should be
determinative. See note 51 infra and accompanying text.
44. This is the definition given in the leading Canadian case, Dakota Lumber Co. v.
Rinderknecht, 2 West. L.R. (Can.) 275 (Nw. Terr. 1905). The United States definition, which
arises in the context of diversity of citizenship cases, is that a person is a citizen of the state of his
domicile. E.g., Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1399 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 842 (1974);
Janzen v. Goos, 302 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir. 1962). This eliminates, for purposes of diversity, the
possibility of simultaneous citizenship of two or more states. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws § 11(2) (1971). But see id. § 11, comment n (conflicting conclusions about domicile are
sometimes reached by courts of separate states). The Dakota Lumber case, however, implies that
dual state citizenship is possible for purposes of recognition of an American judgment in Canada.
Admittedly, the case speaks in restrictive terms: a United States citizen is subject to the
jurisdiction of the courts of "the State in which he resides, but not... any other State .... ." 2
West. L.R. (Can.) at 278. But, since a person can simultaneously be a resident of more than one
state, a definition which relies upon the term "resides" necessarily must encompass situations of
dual state citizenship. On the other hand, it can be argued that the intent of the above quoted
words was to establish the more restrictive concept of "domicile" as the court's standard.
In any event, partly because of the relative difficulty in defining state citizenship as opposed to
national citizenship, one British commentator cautions that citizenship cannot currently be relied
upon as a basis for jurisdiction in the international sense. This is particularly so where the
citizenship in question is of the United States. J. Morris, Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of
Laws 1003 (9th ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Dicey and Morris].
45. It is unavailing to take a judgment from the adjudicating state to the state of defendant's
citizenship in order to get a new judgment to be brought to Canada. The second judgment will
not be recognized in Canada, even though defendant is a citizen of the second state, because that
state is a mere conduit which must give full faith and credit to the original judgment. Frederick
A. Jones, Inc. v. Toronto Gen. Ins. Co., [1933] 2 D.L.R. 660, 672-73 (Ont.) (Masten, J.A.)
(Florida judgment against corporation was taken to state where corporation did business and a
new judgment was issued; recognition refused).
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case of United States judgments, this rule would not facilitate recognition in
Canada in any instances not already encompassed by the jurisdictional base
founded upon residence. 46
An interesting question is whether a judgment of a federal district court
would be considered by provincial tribunals a judgment of a "national" court.
In other words, would a provincial court find defendant's United States
citizenship at the time of service jurisdictionally sufficient, regardless of
whether he were a citizen of the state in which the district court sits? 47
Although there is no Canadian law directly on point,4 8 the provincial courts'
practice of applying the same rules of recognition without distinction to both
state and federal judgments provides a partial answer.4 9 Moreover, were the
issue to be decided by a Canadian tribunal, the federal judgment would not
likely be held to be one from a national court because, in many instances,
personal jurisdiction of federal district courts is defined by state jurisdictional
standards.50 This being the case, Canadian courts would likely find no reason
to differentiate, since the federal courts would be sitting as mere surrogates
for state tribunals. This, of course, is the reality in diversity cases.5 ' A
contrary argument, however, can be constructed in those instances where in
personam jurisdiction of federal courts is fixed independently of state norms s2
46. See note 38 supra.
47. If so, service anywhere within the country upon a United States citizen-defendant could
support a federal court judgment capable of recognition in Canada.
48. The judgment sought to be recognized in Dakota Lumber was issued by a state court In
South Dakota. Dakota Lumber Co. v. Rinderknecht, 2 West. L.R. (Can.) 275 (Nw. Terr. 1905).
49. See, e.g., Hughes .v. Sharp, 70 D.L.R.2d 298 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1968), rev'd on other
grounds, 5 D.L.R.3d 760 (B.C. 1969) (judgment of federal district court recognized under
precedents used for judgments from state courts); First Nat'l Bank v. Harris, 10 Ont. 2d 516
(Supp. Ct. 1975) (same).
50. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)-(e) (effective service may be made in the manner prescribed by the
law of the state in which the district court is held); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f) (effective service may be
made within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held).
51. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1945). In a case involving federal
substantive rights, on the other hand, the entire nation is governed by one system of law. Dakota
Lumber, in essence, held that the only allegiance that is relevant to the question of jurisdiction of
a foreign court is citizenship to the territory governed by the legal system utilized in the lawsuit.
Dakota Lumber Co. v. Rinderknecht, 2 West. L.R. (Can.) 275, 276-77 (Nw. Terr. 1905). Thus,
national citizenship would appear to be sufficient in an action to recognize a judgment decided
under federal substantive law. Nevertheless, insofar as federal courts look to state law in one
crucial area, their own in personam jurisdiction, it is unlikely that a Canadian court could be
convinced that anything other than citizenship of the adjudicating state is sufficient.
52. E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 5, 22 (1970) (nationwide service of process in antitrust actions); Id. §
78aa (global service of process in suits under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); 28 U.S.C. §
2361 (1970) (nationwide service of process in interpleader actions); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(1) (in
certain cases effective service may be made within 100 miles of the courthouse, irrespective of
state jurisdictional rules); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i) (effective service may be made In foreign
countries in instances beyond those authorized by federal or state law). See generally C. Wright &
A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil §§ 1118, 1125 (1969). As to Canada's reaction to
giving extraterritorial effect to United States antitrust laws, see Henry, The United States
Antitrust Laws: A Canadian Viewpoint, 8 Can. Y.B. Int'l L. 249 (1970).
FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS
Other difficulties arise under the fifth category, agreements to submit to a
foreign forum.5 3 Because the existence of any such agreement is a question of
fact,54 careful distinctions must be drawn between the situations in which
submission to a foreign tribunal will be found by a Canadian court. For
example, when business corporation statutes, or the certificate of incorpora-
tion governing a foreign corporation expressly provide that a shareholder is
answerable to the courts of the incorporating country (or state), the act of
becoming a shareholder, while not an express contract, is a manifestation of
conduct that gives rise by implication in fact to an agreement to submit to
such jurisdiction.55
It might be supposed that the same implication of consent would be made
in the case of a statute requiring appointment of the secretary of state as agent
to receive service of process arising out of any motor vehicle accident
involving a nonresident driver.5 6 The contrary is probably the case. When
faced with the issue, a Canadian court would likely find that mere operation
of a motor vehicle within the state by a Canadian resident is insufficient to
signify an agreement by the Canadian that a summons served upon the
secretary of state has the same force as if served upon him personally. 57 The
provincial court would therefore hold that the American tribunal lacked
territorial jurisdiction over the defendant. The United States plaintiff would
find that his judgment, founded upon statutory service on the secretary of
state, would go unrecognized in Canada.
The actions appear similar and it could be argued that purchase of stock
and driving in the state are analogous and therefore both should subject the
nonresident to the jurisdiction imposed by the statutes. A possible rationale
53. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
54. See note 41 supra.
55. See Canadian Annotation, supra note 39, at 10-11; Recognition, supra note 13, at 44-45;
cf. Allen v. Standard Trusts Co., 57 D.L.R. 105, 108-11 (Man. 1920) (shareholder, sued in
Manitoba upon liability created by the laws of Minnesota, deemed to be subject to suit in both
Manitoba and Minnesota).
Contrast a situation where a Canadian resident purchases stock in a foreign corporation whose
certificate is silent on the matter, as are the laws of the incorporating country. In this instance,
according to Canadian courts, the act of buying the stock does not clearly evince an intention to
agree to submit to the foreign courts. No agreement in fact will be implied. Canadian Annotation,
supra note 39, at 10-12.
Relying on some of these same cases, a British commentator has concluded that agreements to
submit to the jurisdiction of a foreign court must be express. Dicey and Morris, supra note 44, at
999. An example of an express agreement to submit is a corporation directly appointing the
secretary of state as agent for service, as required by statute. A judgment founded upon this
express agreement is recognized in Canada. See Recognition, supra note 13, at 45. Even if the
corporation made no such express agreement, it still may be subject to the foreign court's
jurisdiction if it is doing business in the state. See note 38 supra.
56. E.g., N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 253 (McKinney 1970); Hwy. Traf. Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. c.
202, § 134 (1970).
57. Richardson, Problems in Conffict of Laws Relating to Automobiles, 13 Can. B. Rev. 201,
206-09 (1935). The author puts forth a plausible argument that Canadian courts would find no
submission, although case law directly on point is nonexistent
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for the difference in treatment is in the degree of deliberation involved in each
act. A securities purchaser, particularly one who buys into a company
incorporated in a foreign country, presumably acts only after inquiry and
reflection. Driving a car across an open border is not such a considered act.
The distinction drawn is, of course, cold comfort to a victim of the driver's
negligence.
b. The Problem of Jurisdiction Based Upon Service
Outside the Forum
Many United States judgments brought to Canada for recognition are
founded upon statutory jurisdiction over the defendant. Where an American
court has in personam territorial jurisdiction, the fact that defendant was
served abroad pursuant to a statute is unimportant because territorial juris-
diction alone is sufficient.5 8 If, on the other hand, the court's power over the
defendant is based solely upon the statute, jurisdiction is insufficient, and
recognition will be denied in Canada.5 9 This is the case in numerous instances
because, as the above discussion would indicate, many situations encom-
passed by modern long-arm and other jurisdictional statutes fall outside the
realm of territorial jurisdiction.
In Canada, jurisdictional standards required of foreign courts for purposes
of recognition were never made dependent upon norms formulated for Cana-
dian courts in asserting their own in personam jurisdiction.60 Instead, the
twin facets evolved separately. 6' Today, Canadian courts assert contempo-
rary forms of statutory jurisdiction over absent defendants. 62 At the same
time, they insist that, in recognition actions, the foreign tribunal must have
had territorial jurisdiction over the defendant. 63 Insofar as Canadian courts
embrace modern forms of statutory jurisdiction while refusing to acknowledge
comparable forms asserted by foreign tribunals, they adhere to a double
standard. 64
58. See Pemberton v. Hughes, [1899] 1 Ch. 781, 791 (C.A.) (Lindley, M.R.) (British decision).
Canadian courts look to Pemberton in defining the requirements for foreign court jurisdiction
sufficient for recognition. See note 28 supra. In Pemberton the defendant contended that the
Florida decree was void because the plaintiff did not comply with a state statute requiring ten
days notice of the lawsuit. The court, deeming this contention unimportant, refused to reach it.
Id. at 790 (Lindley, M.R.). So long as the defendant was served within Florida, it was irrelevant
that the ten day notice period was not afforded. See id. at 789-90 (Lindley, M.R.); id. at 795-96
(Vaughan Williams, L.J.). This of course means that it is possible for a foreign judgment to have
greater effect in England, and Canada, than it has in the country where it was rendered. In such
a case, though jurisdiction would be invalid under the local law of the adjudicating court, it
would be proper in the international sense.
59. See notes 65-67 infra and accompanying text.
60. See Recognition, supra note 13, at 46-47.
61. Some commentators have argued that the two standards should develop separately and
should be based on different considerations. Others, perhaps more practical, disagree. See note 77
infra.
62. See Canadian Conflicts, supra note 10, at 226-35, 244-68.
63. See notes 31-33 supra and accompanying text.
64. The inconsistency has not gone unnoticed by commentators in Canada or by those in
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In Gyonyor v. Sanjenko,65 for example, a default judgment was obtained
against defendant, a resident of the province of Alberta. The action arose out
of a motor vehicle accident in Montana, and defendant was duly served under
that state's long-arm statute. Although the Montana court had statutory
jurisdiction under its own laws, the Alberta court held that the state tribunal
lacked the requisite common-law territorial jurisdiction over the defendant. 66
The court denied recognition and enforcement of the judgment.67 Yet Alberta
has a long-arm statute quite similar to the Montana statute utilized by the
plaintiff in Gyonyor.68 In essence, the Alberta court afforded to the Montana
England, where the disparity originated and still persists. See, e.g., Cheshire, supra note 10, at
87-88, 693 (England); Williston & Rolls, supra note 38, at 11 (Canada); Castel, Jurisdiction and
Money Judgments Rendered Abroad. Anglo-American and French Practice Compared, 4 McGill
L.J. 152, 174 (1958) (Canada); Hurlburt, Conflict of Laws-Jurisdiction-Service Ex Juris-Place
of Tort, 52 Can. B. Rev. 470, 479-80 (1974) (Canada) [hereinafter cited as Hurlburt]; Kennedy,
"Reciprocity" in the Recognition of Foreign Judgments, 32 Can. B. Rev. 359, 378-83 (1954)
(Canada) [hereinafter cited as Reciprocity]; Recognition, supra note 13, at 56-60 (Canada).
65. 23 D.L.R.3d 695 (Alta. Sup. CL 1971).
66. Id. at 697-98.
67. Id. at 698. Indeed, this result was mandated by the lingering rule of Sirdar Gurdyal Singh
v. Rajah of Faridkote, [1894] A.C. 670 (P.C.) (Punjab); see notes 32-33 supra and accompanying
text. In that case the court made it dear that a judgment rendered by a court with statutory, but
not territorial, jurisdiction is valid only in the country of the adjudicating court. -[The defendant)
is under no obligation of any kind to obey [such a judgment]; and it must be regarded as a mere
nullity by the Courts of every nation except (when authorized by special local legislation [e.g., a
long-arm statute]) in the country of the forum by which it was pronounced." Id. at 684.
68. Compare, for example, the relevant portions of the long-arm statutes of the two
jurisdictions, Montana and Alberta, involved in the litigation in Gyonyor v. Sanjenko, 23
D.L.R.3d 695 (Alta. Sup. Ct. 1971).
Mont. R. Civ. P. 4B: "JURISDICTION OF PERSONS. (1) Subject to Jurisdiction. All
persons found within the state of Montana are subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this
state. In addition, any person is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any
claim for relief arising from the doing personally, through an employee, or through an agent, of
any of the following acts: . . . (b) the commission of any act which results in accrual within this
state of a tort action; ... (e) entering into a contract for services to be rendered or for materials to
be furnished in this state by such person .... "
Alta. R. of Ct. 30: "Service outside of Alberta of any document by which any proceeding is
commenced, or of notice thereof, may be allowed by the Court whenever:... (f) the proceeding is to
enforce, rescind, resolve, annul or otherwise affect a contract or to recover damages or obtain any
other relief in respect of the breach of a contract, being (in any case) a contract (i) made within
Alberta, or (ii) made by or through an agent trading or residing within Alberta on behalf of a
principal trading or residing out of Alberta, or (iii) which is by its terms, or by implication
governed by Alberta law, or (iv) in which the parties thereto agree that the courts of Alberta shall
have jurisdiction to entertain any action in respect of the contract; ... (h) the action is founded
on a tort committed within Alberta .... "
While the circumstances encompassed by the two rules are quite similar, certain elements do
differ. The operation of the Alberta rule is discretionary with the court while the Montana rule is
automatic. There are other differences in language and specificity. One commentator has
suggested that provincial long-arm jurisdictional provisions similar to Alberta's be made more
definite. Granger, Conflict of Laws-Jurisdiction-Place of Commission of Tort-Moran v. Pyle,
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tribunal a narrower sweep of jurisdictional power than the provincial tribunal
itself claimed.
Nonetheless, the decision in Gyonyor would appear at first glance to be
eminently reasonable. The Alberta court was discharging its duty by follow-
ing precedents of English common law, and it could be said there was nothing
irrational in the court's refusal to acknowledge the Montana court's authority
merely because the latter had jurisdiction according to Montana law. After
all, to Canadians, Montana operates under somewhat unfamiliar laws. More-
over, United States courts may possess different and greater power than do
Canadian courts. Thus, recognition of judgments from American courts
could, in effect, result in provincial courts exercising authority other than that
which can be granted by their own parliaments. 69
While the position of Canadian courts in recognizing only territorial juris-
diction can be understood, it cannot be justified as a practical matter. For one
thing, it is not true that a judgment handed down by a United States court
and founded upon long-arm jurisdiction is rendered by a tribunal with greater
powers than the courts of Canada. The long-arm statutes of the common-law
provinces70 are quite similar to those of the states of the United States. 7'
Admittedly, the facets of jurisdiction of provincial courts and acknowl-
edgement of jurisdiction in the hands of foreign courts have evolved indepen-
dently, 72 but both have been largely judge-made. 7 3 A coordinated exam-
ination and revision has not been undertaken. 74 Nor have the Canadian
7 Ottawa L. Rev. 240, 246 (1975). However, the most important distinction in language probably
is that the Montana rule confers personal jurisdiction on the court in the enumerated Instances,
while the Alberta rule provides for only discretionary service of process outside the jurisdiction.
However, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that service upon a nonresident defendant,
pursuant to a provincial long-arm statute, imparts jurisdiction over the defendant to the
provincial court. Moran v. Pyle Natl (Canada) Ltd., 43 D.L.R.3d 239, 242-43 (Can. 1973) (tort
action). Thus, whenever the Canadian court decides to allow long-arm service, the effect of the
two rules is identical.
Canadian long-arm statutes generally require personal service upon the defendant in the
foreign jurisdiction. E.g., Ont. R. Prac. & Pro. 29, codified at Ont. Rev. Regs., reg. 545, r. 29
(1970).
69. Recognition, supra note 13, at 11.
70. See J.-G. Castel, Private International Law 245 & n.56 (1960).
71. See, e.g., the Canadian and American long-arm statutes set out in note 68 supra.
72. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
73. One facet, rules of foreign judgment recognition, has primarily been created by common-
law judges of English and Canadian courts. The other, promulgation in Canada of rules
governing long-arm service and jurisdiction, has typically been delegated by the legislatures to
provincial judges. For example, the Legislature of Ontario has empowered a Rules Committee to
formulate rules, inter alia, allowing service of process outside of Ontario. Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 228, §
114(0)(c) (1970). The Rules Committee is composed primarily of Ontario provincial court judges
and lawyers. Id. § 114(1). Its acts are subject to the approval of the Lieutenant Governor In
Council. Id. § 114(10).
74. But see Hurlburt, supra note 64, at 478-80, where the author discusses a recent case
decided by the Supreme Court of Canada, Moran v. Pyle Nat'l (Canada) Ltd., 43 D.L.R.3d 239
(Can. 1973). The Supreme Court in Moran may have laid the ground work for a reassessment of
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courts confronted the problem with an eye toward reconciling the conflict.75
This is unfortunate because the desirability of reciprocity of jurisdiction,
subject to guarantees of natural justice and due process,'7 6 is widely ac-
cepted. 77 Reciprocity of jurisdiction means simply that courts credit foreign
the rules of territorial jurisdiction. See id. at 242; Hurlburt, supra note 64, at 478-S0. This may
lead to a coordinated revision of both sides of the dichotomy. See also Blom, Service Out of the
Jurisdiction-Tort Committed Within the Jurisdiction-Negligent Manufacture-Moran v. Pyle
National (Canada) Ltd., 9 U.B.C.L. Rev. 389 (1974).
The United States has had a different experience evaluating foreign judgments based upon
long-arm jurisdiction. As the needs of a changing world have dictated, the Supreme Court has
liberalized the requirements for constitutionally valid state court jurisdiction over the person.
Compare Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) ("no tribunal [of a state] can extend its
process beyond that territory so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions") with
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) ("now . .. due process requires
only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " (citations and
italics omitted)). This liberalization has meant that long-arm statutes are presumably constitu-
tionally valid; hence judgments rendered under their authority are entitled to full faith and credit
by each sister state when offered for recognition and enforcement. In addition, courts in the
United States will often readily recognize foreign country judgments founded upon long-arm
jurisdiction presumably because they are accustomed to doing so for judgments of sister states.
See note 146 infra.
75. See, e.g., Wedlay v. Quist, [1953] 4 D.L.R. 620 (Alta.); Traders Group Ltd. v. Hopkins,
69 D.L.R.2d 250 (Nw. Terr. Ct.), aff'd, 1 D.L.R.3d 416 (Nw. Terr. 1968). In Wedlay v.
Quist, the Alberta court refused to register a default judgment rendered by a British Columbia
court possessing statutory, but not territorial jurisdiction over the defendant. Rather than expand
common-law notions of jurisdiction in the international sense so as to encompass statutory
jurisdiction, the court argued that it would be better to contract statutory jurisdiction. [19531 4
D.L.R. at 624-25. In short, while this court perceived that there should be a correlation between
jurisdiction exercised and recognized, it would prefer to relinquish its own long-arm jurisdiction
rather than recognize a foreign court's long-arm jurisdiction. But see Reciprocity, supra note 64,
at 374-75 where the author suggests that the court in Wedlay would have given effect to
reciprocity of jurisdiction, had the argument been made.
The suggestion is questionable because Alberta's highest court had failed, just one year before
the decision in Wedlay v. Quist, to include foreign statutory jurisdiction as an acceptable basis of
jurisdiction in Alberta. Mattar v. Public Trustee, [1952] 3 D.L.R. 399 (Alta.). Lower Alberta
courts have recently affirmed the Mattar principle and similarly have failed to give effect to
foreign statutory jurisdiction, whether under the doctrine of reciprocity of jurisdiction or upon
any other basis. Gyonyor v. Sanjenko, 23 D.L.R.3d 695 (Alta. Sup. CL 1971); Bodnar v.
Popovich, [1974] 3 W.W.R. 658 (Alta. Dist. Ct. 1973).
76. Canadian notions of natural justice and due process have been defined as including an
opportunity to be heard and to defend the suit. Castel, Jurisdiction and Money Judgments
Rendered Abroad. Anglo-American and French Practice Compared, 4 McGill L.J. 152, 178
(1958); notes 103-06 infra and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Castel, Jurisdiction and Money Judgments Rendered Abroad. Anglo-American
and French Practice Compared, 4 McGill L.J. 152, 178 (1958); Reciprocity, supra note 64, at
378-83. But see A. von Mehren and Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey
and a Suggested Approach, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1601, 1617 n.53 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Foreign
Adjudications], where the authors use the term "equivalence" of jurisdiction, so as to avoid
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tribunals with forms of jurisdiction similar to those which they themselves
claim. 78 Using the example of Gyonyor v. Sanjenko,79 were Canadian courts
to adopt the doctrine of reciprocity of jurisdiction, the Alberta court would
acknowledge the validity of the Montana court's statutory jurisdiction because
Alberta's and Montana's jurisdictional statutes80 are so similar. 8
While the future may bring changes in the form of increased recognition of
judgments founded upon statutory jurisdiction, the current status of Canada's
rules of territorial jurisdiction can be illustrated by an elementary, but
undoubtedly frequent, example. Suppose a New York resident is injured in
New York while riding in a car negligently driven by a resident of Ontario.
The driver is devoid of United States assets, as is his insurer. Of course,
personal service within New York is always sufficient, but suppose further
that the Canadian is back home before service can be effected.
Counsel's first reaction might be to serve the secretary of state, deemed the
agent of the nonresident driver under the New York statute. Ontario has an
almost identical law,8 2 but because of the double standard, the Ontario court
would not acknowledge this jurisdictional predicate merely because the court
itself assumes this jurisdiction. Nor is defendant's conduct of the character
likely to induce a Canadian court to imply an agreement to submit to a New
York court. Any judgment founded upon this service would be rendered by a
court lacking territorial in personam jurisdiction.
Counsel may then decide to serve personally the Canadian in Ontario under
New York's long-arm statute, since the driver is alleged to have committed a
tort within New York. Ontario has a similar long-arm statute, but, due to the
double standard, this is of no import. Unless the Canadian falls within one of
the above five categories,8 3 the New York court has no territorial jurisdiction,
regardless of the tribunal's statutory in personam jurisdiction. The judgment
would go unrecognized.
Finally, counsel perhaps would resolve to litigate in Ontario. Jurisdiction is
no problem, for the driver presumably can be found and served within the
confusion with the term "reciprocity" as used in Hilton v. Guyot (discussed at notes 137-55 &
211-14 infra and accompanying text). They conclude that, at present, "equivalence" is an
unsatisfactory jurisdictional model because assumption of jurisdiction and acknowledgement of
foreign court jurisdiction should be based on different factors. Foreign Adjudications, supra at
1621.
78. See Reciprocity, supra note 64, at 359.
79. 23 D.L.R.3d 695 (Alta. Sup. Ct. 1971).
80. See note 68 supra.
81. In defining the doctrine of reciprocity of jurisdiction, commentators have not suggested
that the relevant jurisdictional statutes must be identical, merely similar. Reciprocity, supra note
64, at 359; Recognition, supra note 13, at 46-47. One commentator in a discussion of reciprocity
of jurisdiction in foreign divorce laws, puts forth a proposal that is of general application to
reciprocity of jurisdiction in foreign money judgments. He suggests that if the two jurisdictional
statutes are founded upon the "same substantial basis," the requisite similarity exists and the
doctrine can and should be applied. Reciprocity, supra note 64, at 363.
82. See the statutes cited in note 56 supra.
83. See text accompanying notes 37-41 supra.
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province. 84 But there is a catch. Even though the Ontario court would have
jurisdiction, the action would be dismissed. Under their choice of law ruless
Ontario courts refuse to hear an action involving an out-of-province wrong,
unless the wrong is of such character that it would have been actionable if
committed in Ontario. 86 Because Ontario has a guest statute barring suits in
Ontario by gratuitous passengers against drivers, the hypothetical passenger is
effectively deprived of his last remaining remedy against the negligent
driver.
87
The above hypothetical exemplifies the undesirable situation now existing
between these two countries. There are instances, however, where the judg-
ment creditor is able to surmount the significant obstacle of territorial
jurisdiction. In such cases the judgment still must meet several other stan-
dards before recognition in Canada is gained.
2. The Foreign Money Judgment Must be a Final Judgment
This prerequisite to recognition has been settled law since at least the
nineteenth century. 88 The principle, still followed in Canada, 89 is that for a
foreign judgment to be recognized, the judgment creditor must show9" that it-
is conclusive, final, and has established the debt as res judicata between the
parties. 9 1 The rationale is that it would be unfair to fix the rights of the
84. If the driver's assets are in another province, it would do no good to sue in Ontario. This
is because the other provinces essentially are foreign jurisdictions. See note 19 supra and
accompanying text. Thus, any Ontario judgment founded upon long-arm jurisdiction could be
met with a familiar defense: the Ontario court lacked territorial jurisdiction over the defendant.
85. Choice of law doctrines, which are areas of conflict of laws separate from the sphere of
foreign judgment recognition, are beyond the scope of this Comment.
86. See Hancock, Canadian-American Torts in the Conflict of Laws: The Revival of
Policy-Determined Construction Analysis, 46 Can. B. Rev. 226, 228-29 (1968) and cases cited
therein.
87. Id. An eventuality which should be considered is that plaintiff may successfully convince
the Ontario court to hear the action. The possibility exists that the court would spare plaintiff the
hardship of effectively being denied access to any court.
88. Nouvion v. Freeman, 15 App. Cas. 1, 8-9 (1889) (Lord Herschell).
89. See, e.g., Walls v. Hanson, 49 D.L.R.2d 435, 439 (N.B. County CL 1964); Lear v. Lear,
38 D.L.R.3d 655, 657-58 (Ont. High Ct. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 51 D.L.R.3d 56 (Ont.
1974); Ashley v. Gladden, [1954] 4 D.L.R. 848, 851-52 (Ont.).
90. A recent case illustrates the dimensions of the burden that the judgment creditor carries.
In Lear v. Lear, 51 D.L.R.3d 56 (Ont. 1974), the court held that while the party seeking
recognition carried the burden of proving conclusiveness, as the term is defined by the law of the
adjudicating state, failure to meet that burden did not result in automatic denial of recognition.
Rather, where the burden is not met, it is assumed that the foreign judgment is similar to a like
Canadian judgment- Thus, it would be deemed final if a comparable provincial judgment would
be so deemed. Id. at 61-63. This liberal approach significantly eases the requirement of proving
the finality of a judgment because it affords the plaintiff the option of either proving finality
according to the law of the adjudicating state, or relying upon notions of finality according to the
law of the enforcing province.
91. Nouvion v. Freeman, 15 App. Cas. 1, 9 (1889) (Lord Herschell).
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parties in the Canadian court if a modification of the underlying judgment
could be obtained in the original court. 92
A default judgment should also be subject to this general principle. Thus,
the default judgment should be capable of recognition only if the prescribed
period, if any, for reopening the litigation has passed. It has been held,
however, that a foreign default judgment is a final judgment as long as it
stands, even though it may eventually be set aside by the rendering court. 93
3. The Foreign Money Judgment Must Be For a Definite or
Easily Ascertainable Sum
The judgment debt must show an amount on its face, or be easily computed
based upon the information contained in the judgment. 94 Since a judgment
92. The fact that the judgment is subject to an appeal, or even that an appeal is pending, is,
as a common-law proposition, an insufficient reason to deny recognition. E.g., Davis v. Williams,
[1938] Ont. W.N. 504, 505 (High Ct.). It is immaterial that the judgment is capable of being
rescinded or varied by another court of competent appellate jurisdiction, so long as the
adjudicating court cannot alter its decree. Recognition, supra note 13, at 61. The rule in the
United States is the same. Judgments subject to appeal may be recognized. See note 227 infra and
accompanying text.
The Canadian rule is subject to an exception where, according to the law of the original court,
the judgment creditor is prevented from executing upon the judgment during the pendency of the
appeal. In this and other limited cases, recognition is refused until after the appeal is decided.
Recognition, supra note 13, at 62. Further, the common-law rule has been altered by the
Canadian enforcement statute. Under this legislation a judgment subject to an appeal is to be
denied recognition. See note 227 infra and accompanying text.
93. Boyle v. Victoria Yukon Trading Co., 9 B.C. 213 (1902). The default may be denied
recognition, however, if the judgment debtor shows to the Canadian court "manifest error" in the
judgment. Id. at 217; see Re Gacs and Maierovitz, 68 D.L.R.2d 345, 350-51 (B.C. Sup. Ct.
1968). This part of the opinion in Boyle and the opinion in Re Gacs deal with an issue closely
related to finality of foreign judgments. The issue is whether a final judgment is conclusive, or is
capable of impeachment for error in fact or in law. The portion of the Boyle opinion holding that
the judgment can be impeached for "manifest error" has been criticized as erroneous. Recogni-
tion, supra note 13, at 70-71. The basis of the critique is that, in allowing a challenge to tile
merits of the judgment, the court in Boyle violated the common-law rule universally adhered to in
Canada. The rule states that the merits of a foreign judgment, whether or not taken by default,
shall not be re-examined, even where manifest error shows on its face. In essence, at common
law, every foreign judgment is taken as conclusive on the merits. No defense may be asserted in
the recognition proceeding, if it could have been asserted at trial. See, e.g., State Bank of Butler
v. Benzanson, 16 D.L.R. 848 (Alta. Sup. Ct. 1914).
By virtue of Boyle and its progeny, British Columbia is the only province where, at common
law, a default judgment is refused recognition if manifest error is shown. Recognition, supra note
13, at 71.
The common-law rule has been modified by statute, notably in Manitoba. In that province
defenses that could have been raised in the original action may be interposed in the recognition
proceeding. Man. Rev. Stat. c. C280, § 83 (1970). The problem with this type of statute is that, in
sanctioning a retrial of the merits, it sterilizes the foreign tribunal by ignoring its judgment and
denying its very existence. Cf. Nadelmann, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Canada, 38
Can. B. Rev. 68, 81-82 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Nadelmann].
94. See Recognition, supra note 13, at 64-65. Similarly, Canadian courts will not recognize in
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creates a contract debt between the parties,9 5 the judgment creditor must
bring an action on the judgment within the statutory period, generally
computed from the date of judgment. 96
4. The Foreign Judgment Must Not Have Been
Obtained Through Fraud
Tension exists between the desire of Canadian courts to preclude recogni-
tion of foreign judgments obtained through fraud and the general policy of
treating foreign judgments as conclusive on the merits.97 To reconcile the
conflict, a distinction is drawn between fraud relating to a matter which was
in issue before the foreign court and fraud connected with an issue never
brought before the original tribunal (extrinsic fraud).98 In the former case, the
defendant is deemed to have had an opportunity to raise the alleged fraud in
the original action. It is assumed that it was raised and rejected, or was not
raised, and was thereby waived. Thus, a foreign judgment upon a contract
allegedly obtained by fraud will not be denied recognition.99
With regard to extrinsic fraud, the foreign judgment will be vitiated.' 00
There is no objection to consideration of the alleged fraud by the Canadian
court because the matter is not part of the record of the foreign court and impliedly
was never considered there.
5. The Foreign Proceedings Must Not Offend Canadian Notions
of Natural Justice
The importance of the concept of natural (or substantial) justice to the
principles of foreign judgment recognition was concisely stated in Pemberton
v. Hughes:10 1
If a judgment is pronounced by a foreign Court over persons within its jurisdiction and
in a matter with which it is competent to deal, English Courts never investigate the
propriety of the proceedings in the foreign Court, unless they offend against English
views of substantial justice.'0 2
personam or in rem decrees ordering an act. E.g., Duke v. Andler, [1932] 4 D.L.R. 529 (Can.)
(California decree purporting directly to transfer title to British Columbia realty denied recogni-
tion).
95. E.g., State Bank of Butler v. Benzanson, 16 D.L.R. 848 (Alta. Sup. Ct. 1914) (dictum).
96. The statutory period for simple contract actions is typically six years. E.g., Ont. Rev.
Stat. c. 246, § 45(1)(g) (1970).
97. See note 93 supra.
98. Locke v. Hulett, [1929] 3 D.L.R. 572, 575-76 (Alta. Sup. C.). Examples of extrinsic
fraud are allegations of bribing of witnesses by the plaintiff and allegations, supported by specific
proof, that the foreign court itself fraudulently conspired to give judgment against the defendant.
Dicey and Morris, supra note 44, at 1028; Recognition, supra note 13, at 97. In the latter case, it
would be ludicrous to deny a rehearing on this matter, even if it were raised and rejected in the
original action.
99. Recognition, supra note 13, at 89. -
100. Id. A foreign judgment will also be denied recognition if it is shown that the foreign
court was fraudulently led to believe it had jurisdiction. Powell v. Cockburn, 68 D.L.R.3d 700,
708-14 (Can. 1976) (Dickson, J.).
101. [1899] 1 Ch. 781 (C.A.). For cases reaffirming Pemberton in Canada, see note 28 supra.
102. [1899] 1 Ch. at 790 (Lindley, M.R.).
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Thus, even if the onerous task of obtaining territorial jurisdiction is
accomplished, 10 3 recognition may be denied in any event when the foreign
procedures are contrary to Canada's sense of natural justice.
The concept has not been precisely defined, but it is clear that it has been
sparingly applied. One proposed definition is that natural justice refers to
alleged irregularities of a very serious nature, not in the underlying merits of
the foreign judgment, but in the procedure of the issuing court. 10 4
Lack of natural justice is never presumed, but is a defense to be raised by
the judgment debtor. 10 5 It generally arises when the defendant has not been
given proper notice and an opportunity to be heard. 10 6 Thus, the concept
resembles American notions of due process. The two are not coextensive,
however. In the United States, evaluation of jurisdictional bases asserted by
foreign courts, and scrutiny of notice and hearing afforded to the defendant
are both made under principles of due process. In Canada, on the other hand,
evaluation of jurisdictional bases is governed by the separate requirement of
territorial jurisdiction. 10 7 Thus, when the jurisdictional predicate is not in
accord with the rules of territorial jurisdiction, the judgment would be
disposed of on that ground. Only when the predicate is sufficient for territorial
jurisdiction (e.g., agreement to submit to the foreign court'0 8 ) would the
defense of denial of natural justice, due to lack of notice and hearing, 10 9
become relevant.
Public policy is an area related to natural justice. While a foreign judgment
will not be recognized if it is contrary to the public policy of the province, 10 it
is difficult to define what exactly is provincial public policy."' A judge must,
103. See part lI-A(1)(a) supra.
104. Recognition, supra note 13, at 99. But see note 109 infra.
105. See Burchell v. Burchell, [1926] 2 D.L.R. 595, 602 (Ont. Sup. Ct.).
106. Patton v. Reed, 30 D.L.R.3d 494, 498 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1972); Romano v. Maggiora,
[1935] 2 W.W.R. 524 (B.C. Sup. Ct.).
107. See part II-A(1)(a) supra.
108. See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
109. The term "natural justice" also has been used in a different sense. It has been intimated
that in extreme cases Canadian courts may delve into the merits of the foreign judgment. See
Burchell v. Burchell, [1926] 2 D.L.R. at 601 (dictum). This would occur when it is alleged that
the foreign law itself, rather than lack of notice or other procedural matters, is repugnant to
notions of natural justice. In this sense natural justice is similar to Canadian notions of public
policy.
In Burchell, the American judgment was founded upon an Ohio law giving jurisdiction to Ohio
courts to determine equitable rights in foreign land. The Ontario court stated that the law was
not contrary to public policy, and not repugnant to natural justice. Thus, there was no cause to
re-examine the merits. Id. at 600-03.
Even when the foreign law itself is challenged, Canadian courts would be reluctant to
re-examine the merits meticulously. Thus, any hearing on natural justice would presumably
concern itself with the foreign law itself, not the foreign court's interpretation of that law. See id.
at 602.
110. It has been asserted that no foreign judgment has yet been refused recognition in Canada
on public policy grounds. Canadian Conflicts, supra note 10, at 510.
111. Read, supra note 19, at 288.
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to a certain extent, adhere to precedent defining public policy, but he may
adapt the elements of public policy to the case before him."12 Thus, it is
difficult to develop a catalogue of circumstances thought to be repugnant to,
or in accord with, the province's sense of public policy."13 A recent British
Columbia case considered a challenge on public policy grounds to recognition
of an American judgment. 11 4 The court there held that an Idaho judgment for
alimony was not contrary to the public policy of the province, even though it
was for alimony in arrears for over one year. The judge used his discretion,
rather than precedent, in reaching this conclusion.'"5
Another area related to natural justice is the foreign tribunal's competence
under its own law. If a judgment is rendered by a foreign court possessing
subject matter and territorial in personam jurisdiction, Canadian courts do
not investigate the propriety of the exercise of that jurisdiction, unless the
foreign action is repugnant to Canadian notions of natural justice. 116
B. The Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act
Many provinces have somewhat eased the common-law rules of foreign
money judgment recognition through passage of versions of the Reciprocal
Enforcement of Judgments Act (Canadian Act). "17 This statute, which will be
examined in detail later,118 considerably facilitates enforcement of money
112. Recognition, supra note 13, at 107.
113. Read, supra note 19, at 288-95, delineates several categories of judgments refused
recognition as contrary to the public policy of the recognizing forum. These classes, derived from
a review of British, American and Canadian cases, are: foreign money judgments imposing a fine
(punitive damages are not classified as a fine), judgments for taxes, judgments on claims illegal in
the recognizing province, judgments on causes of action both unknown in the recognizing
province, and contrary to its established policy.
114. Patton v. Reed, 30 D.L.R.3d 494 (B.C. Sup. CL 1972).
115. Id. at 498-500.
116. See Pemberton v. Hughes, [1899] 1 Ch. 781, 790-91 (C.A.) (Lindley, M.R.); Dicey &
Morris, supra note 44, at 1025-26; Recognition, supra note 13, at 52-55.
117. Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, [1958] Proceedings of the Uniform Law
Conference of Canada 90, as amended, [1962] Proceedings, at 108, as amended, [19671 Proceed-
ings, at 22 [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as Canadian Act]. The official text of the
Canadian Act is set out in Appendix Hl infra. See also Nadelmann, supra note 93. This act,
sometimes modified, has been adopted by all Canadian provinces and territories except Quebec.
While it has been urged that its adoption by Quebec would not do violence to the province's
unique legal system, Quebec Judgments, supra note 7, at 137-40, the suggestion has not been
heeded.
In the other provinces the Canadian Act is codified at- Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 312 (1970) (Alberta);
B.C. Rev. Stat. c. 331 (1960) (British Columbia); Man. Rev. Stat. c. J20 (1970) (Manitoba); N.B.
Rev. Stat. c. R-3 (1973) (New Brunswick); Newf. Rev. Stat. c. 327 (1970) (Newfoundland); N.S.
Stat. c. 13 (1973) (Nova Scotia); Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 402 (1970) (Ontario); P.E.I. Rev. Stat. c. R-7
(1974) (Prince Edward Island); Sask. Rev. Stat. c. 92 (1965) (Saskatchewan). In the territories the
legislation is designated the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Ordinance, and is codified at:
Nw. Terr. Rev. Ord. c. R-1 (1974) (Northwest Territories); Yuk. Rev. Ord. c. R-1 (1971) (Yukon
Territory).
118. See part IV infra.
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judgments from foreign jurisdictions, provided the latter have reciprocated by
enacting their own versions of the Canadian Act.' 19 In addition, the current
official text potentially applies not only to interprovincial actions, but to
international ones as well. 120
Unfortunately, however, the emphasis in the Canadian Act is on enforce-
ment rather than recognition. That is, while the Canadian Act facilitates
execution of the judgment by providing for simple registration in place of a
suit upon the judgment, it does little to ease the requirements of, for example,
common-law territorial jurisdiction, a stringent prerequisite to recognition. 121
Another drawback to the Act is that registration may be denied if "the
judgment debtor would have a good defence if an action were brought on the
judgment."'1 22 This clause also reaffirms the common-law rules because it, in
effect, makes registration proceedings instituted under the Act subject to the
same common-law principles that govern a suit upon the judgment.' 23
Nonetheless, the Canadians have extended the scope of the Act from
interprovincial to international judgments. 124 This indicates their realization
that some modernization of the means of international judgment recognition is
in order. Moreover, uniform recognition legislation, adopted by the provinces
and states of Canada and the United States after bilateral discussion, may be
a modernization particularly appropriate for these two nations. 125
119. See Appendix III infra for a chart of the Canadian provinces, foreign countries and
foreign states designated "reciprocating states" by each province which has enacted the Canadian
Act.
120. The official text of the Act makes it applicable to domestic and foreign judgments.
Canadian Act § 12(1). Presently, however, only six provinces have enacted provisions which
potentially cover foreign country judgments. See Alta. Rev. Stat. c. 312, § 10 (1970); B.C. Rev.
Stat. c. 331, § 11 (1960); Man. Rev. Stat. c. J20, § 12 (1970); Newf. Rev. Stat. c. 327, § 12
(1970); N.S. Stat. c. 13, § 11 (1973); P.E.I. Rev. Stat. c. R-7, § 11 (1974). Even in these
provinces, no American state has qualified as a reciprocating state. See Appendix III infra. The
acts of the other provinces and territories apply only to judgments rendered within Canada. See
N.B. Rev. Stat. c. R-3, § 8 (1973); Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 402, § 8 (1970); Sask. Rev. Stat. c, 92, § 9
(1965); Nw. Terr. Rev. Ord. c. R-1, § 9 (1974); Yuk. Rev. Ord. c. R-1, § 8 (1971).
121. See Traders Group Ltd. v. Hopkins, 69 D.L.R.2d 250 (Nw. Terr. Terr. Ct.), aff'd, I
D.L.R.3d 416 (Nw. Terr. 1968).
122. Canadian Act § 3(6)(g).
123. See Re Guildhall Ins. Co. and Jackson, 69 D.L.R.2d 137, 139-40 (Alta. Sup. Ct. 1968).
The clause does not, however, empower the court to conduct a retrial of the merits underlying the
original judgment. Id.
124. See note 120 supra and accompanying text. Canada has another uniform act which
applies to foreign country judgments, The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Maintenance
Orders Act. This legislation, which has been adopted by all the provinces and territories except
Quebec, provides for registration and enforcement of orders directing payment of alimony,
maintenance, or child support. See Canadian Conflicts, supra note 10, at 573-74. As a reciprocal
act, it applies only to judgments from courts of jurisdictions that have been designated
reciprocating states. Unlike the situation under the Canadian Act, however, several American
states have been designated reciprocating states by some of the provinces. See, e.g., Alta. Reg.
167/70 (1970) (California); Ont. Reg. 771(2), codified at Ont. Rev. Regs., reg. 771 (1970)
(Michigan, New York).
125. Nadelmann, supra note 93, at 87-88. But see, e.g., Golomb, Recognition of Foreign
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C. Conclusion
From a doctrinal point of view, the Canadian system of foreign country
money judgment recognition makes sense. It is a workable compromise
between a nationalistic desire to protect local citizens from foreign powers and
the realization that Canada is a part of a larger community in which a foreign
judgment must be respected. The principles are based on sound notions of
physical power, due process and other elements of perceived justice that are
extant after at least one hundred years of legal history.
From a practical point of view, however, much more is required. For
example, with modern transportation and communication, it is no longer
reasonable to require, for all practical purposes, personal service within the
forum as a prerequisite to recognition.' 2 6 Statutory jurisdiction, already being
exercised by Canadian courts, should be acknowledged in foreign courts. The
provinces should ease their requirements for recognition of judgments of
United States courts.
mH. RECOGNITION OF CANADIAN JUDGMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
As is the case in Canada, foreign country money judgments usually cannot
be directly enforced in the United States. They first must be recognized. This
is accomplished by reducing them to a judgment of an American court. 12 7 A
Canadian judgment creditor has a choice of American courts, federal or state,
in which to seek the needed American judgment.
Federal courts have jurisdiction to recognize foreign nation judgments in
two general situations. First, if the plaintiff is a citizen of Canada, and the
defendant a citizen of a state, the former will always have the option of suing
Money Judgments: A Goal-Oriented Approach, 43 SL John's L. Rev. 604, 645-48 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Goal-Oriented Approach] (treaty is best means of facilitating foreign
judgment recognition).
126. Cf. Nadelmann, supra note 93, at 83-84; Recognition, supra note 13, at 50, speaking of
interprovincial judgments: "To adhere strictly to the principles [of territorial jurisdiction] enun-
ciated over sixty years ago in Emanuel v. Symon is a sign of backwardness and not in the
tradition of the Anglo-Canadian system." (footnote omitted). As to international judgments, such
as those from the United States, the author asserts that "a more delicate question" is presented.
Id. Perhaps more caution should be shown in the case of international judgments, but it is
submitted that such wariness be held to a minimum in the case of United States judgments. With
their common heritage and legal systems, their long and deep friendship, and their sustained and
growing interchange, Canada and the United States are ripe for creation of dependable proce-
dures for reciprocal recognition of each other's judgments.
Individualization of the rules for each country is a course of action that perhaps may be
profitably pursued. Obviously, with variations in legal systems, the appropriate treatment for a
judgment from certain nations should be different than the appropriate treatment for a judgment
from others. A flexible standard could be developed which accounts for the uniqueness of the
system behind each judgment, while avoiding a requirement of reciprocity. See note 12 supra.
Nevertheless, judgments brought to Canada from most countries are currently treated identically.
The result is inordinate difficulty in gaining recognition of American judgments.
127. See R. von Mehren & Patterson, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign-Country
Judgments in the United States, 6 Law & Pol. in Int'l Bus. 37 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Foreign-Country Judgments].
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upon the judgment in federal court, under diversity of citizenship jurisdic-
tion.1 28 Second, federal courts have jurisdiction where the claim involves a
federal question. 1
29
If the claim is a bare attempt to gain recognition of the judgment, as when
a judgment creditor seeks only to execute against a judgment debtor's assets,
a federal question is probably not presented. 130 On the other hand, a party
may be seeking to apply a foreign judgment to a pending action which itself
directly involves federal law. Recognition of such a judgment may be sought
by the plaintiff merely to facilitate proof of his claim, 13 1 or it may be asserted
by the defendant as a compulsory counterclaim,1 32 or raised by the latter as
128. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970), as amended, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (Supp. 4, Dec. 1976). The
jurisdictional amount of $10,000 must also be met. Id. In most cases involving recognition of
foreign country judgments, the parties are of diverse citizenship. If, however, neither litigant is a
United States citizen, and neither a federal question, nor any other independent federal power
(e.g., admiralty) is involved, federal courts have no subject matter jurisdiction, and the parties
are left to take the matter up in state court. See, e.g., Karakatsanis v. Conquestador Cia. Nay.,
S.A., 247 F. Supp. 423, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
129. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (Supp. 4, Dec. 1976). The matter in controversy must exceed the
jurisdictional amount of $10,000. Id. In addition to this grant of general federal question
jurisdiction, Congress has given federal courts specific federal question jurisdiction in certain
areas, without regard to the amount in controversy. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1970) (bankruptcy);
28 U.S.C. § 1338 (Supp. V 1975) (statutory patents, copyrights, and trademarks); 28 U.S.C. §
1350 (1970) (alien's action for tort committed in violation of international law or treaty); see C.
Wright, Federal Courts § 32, at 123-24 (3d ed. 1976). Federal courts also have jurisdiction to
entertain admiralty actions, 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970), under the independent federal power of
U.S. Const. art. III. Admiralty is not, however, considered to be a general federal question. See
C. Wright, Federal Courts § 17, at 68 (3d ed. 1976).
130. See Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 866 (D. Md. 1961) (dictum); Goal-Oriented
Approach, supra note 125, at 633. A suit for recognition of a judgment is in the nature of an
action for debt. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 100, comment b (1971). Moreover,
the Supreme Court has never held that such an action is a matter calling for the application of a
uniform body of national law. As such, it probably is not "a substantial claim founded 'directly'
upon federal law," hence, not a federal question. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District
Courts, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 157, 168 (1953); see C. Wright, Federal Courts § 17, at 67 (1976).
Thus, in the absence of diversity of citizenship between the parties, it is unlikely that a federal
district court would have jurisdiction to consider a claim solely for recognition. Cf. Moore,
Federalism and Foreign Relations, 1965 Duke L.J. 248, 292 (1965) (speaking generally of foreign
relations cases). It is clear, however, that were the Court to hold that recognition of foreign
country money judgments is a subject governed in all cases by federal common law, see part
III-C infra, the decision automatically would establish federal question jurisdiction. See Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98-100 (1972) (actions decided under federal common law are
federal questions); C. Wright, Federal Courts § 17, at 68 (3d ed. 1976).
131. See Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 862-65 (D. Md. 1961), where the alien plaintiff's
tort claim against the alien defendant directly arose under federal law. Plaintiff sought to apply
his Lebanese judgment to the tort action by pleading it as collateral estoppel on one of the issues.
See id. at 865. Although it lacked diversity jurisdiction, the district court had federal question
jurisdiction to decide the tort claim and ancillary jurisdiction to consider recognition of the
judgment. Id. at 865-66.
132. Cf. id. at 867, where the aliefi defendant asserted a counterclaim against the alien
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res judicata or collateral estoppel. 133 In such cases federal courts have federal
question jurisdiction to hear the federal claim, and may consider recognition
of the foreign judgment, presumably under the concept of ancillary jurisdic-
tion. 13
4
Alternatively, plaintiff may sue in the courts of the state where the
judgment debtor resides or maintains his assets, or in any state court that can
assume personal jurisdiction over the defendant. State court is the only
alternative if the federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction.
A. Recognition in Federal Court
When recognition is sought in federal court, choice of law is first dependent
upon the nature of the claim underlying the judgment. If the recognition
claim is ancillary to one involving a federal question, or is brought in the
District of Columbia, the suit upon the judgment will be decided according to
federal common law. 1 35 On the other hand, where the federal court's subject
matter jurisdiction is based solely upon diversity of citizenship, state substan-
tive law is applied. 13 6
plaintiff. Although the court dismissed the counterclaim as noncompulsory, the tribunal implied
that it would have had ancillary jurisdiction to hear defendant's claim had it been compulsory,
and founded upon a judgment of an Iraqi court. Id. Ancillary jurisdiction would have been
possible because the court had federal question jurisdiction over plaintiffs tort claim. See note
131 supra.
133. See Leo Feist, Inc. v. Debmar Publishing Co., 232 F. Supp. 623 (E.D. Pa. 1964), where
plaintiff's copyright infringement action was brought under the copyright la%s of the United
States. Defendant raised his English judgment as res judicata. The district court had federal
question jurisdiction to hear the infringement matter, and ancillary jurisdiction to recognize the
foreign country judgment, not as res judicata, but as operating as collateral estoppel.
134. "By this concept it is held that a district court acquires jurisdiction of a case or
controversy as an entirety, and may, as an incident to disposition of a matter properly before it,
possess [ancillary] jurisdiction to decide other matters raised by the case of which it could not take
cognizance were they independently presented." C. Wright, Federal Courts § 9, at 21 (3d ed.
1976).
There must be a "tight nexus" between the claim properly before the federal court, and the
matter sought to be brought in under ancillary jurisdiction. Warren G. Kleban Eng'r Corp. v.
Caldwell, 490 F.2d 800, 802 (5th Cir. 1974). Thus, the concept does not extend to a separate and
distinct non-federal claim sought to be joined under the liberal joinder of claims rule. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 18(a); C. Wright, Federal Courts § 78, at 386 (3d ed. 1976). In effect, ancillary
jurisdiction would not comprehend an attempt to invoke federal jurisdiction over a claim for
recognition which bears no relationship to a federal claim, except that they involve the same
parties and one has been joined to the other.
135. Federal questions, admiralty: see, e.g., Leo Feist, Inc. v. Debmar Publishing Co., 232
F. Supp. 623 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (statutory copyright); Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba, S.A. v.
Motor Vessel Ciudad de la Habana, 218 F. Supp. 938 (D. Md. 1963), aff'd, 335 F.2d 619 (4th
Cir. 1964) (admiralty); In re Aktiebolaget Kreuger & Toll, 20 F. Supp. 964 tS.D.N.Y. 1937),
aff'd, 96 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1938) (bankruptcy). District of Columbia see, e.g., Cherun v.
Frishman, 236 F. Supp. 292 (D.D.C. 1964). See also Comment, Erie Limited: The Confines of
State Law in Federal Courts, 40 Corn. L.Q. 561, 574-75 (1955).
136. See part II-A(2) infra.
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1. Federal Common Law
In the area of recognition of foreign country money judgments, federal
common law is largely defined by a Supreme Court case, Hilton v. Guyot. 137
In Hilton the Court refused to recognize the judgment at issue. 138 Neverthe-
less, the Court took the opportunity to formulate the general rule that a
foreign country money judgment should be given full credit and conclusive
effect on the merits whenever the judgment is final, and has been rendered by
a foreign court affording due process to the parties and possessing personal
and subject matter jurisdiction. 139 Such conclusive effect should be given
unless, as in Hilton, the judgment should be impeached because of a showing
of fraud, prejudice, or other matters which, by the principles of international
law and comity, indicate that recognition should not be given. 140 If the
judgment fails to meet these requirements, it is denied conclusive effect and is
merely prima facie evidence of the underlying claim.
Thus, the leading American case has set down the rule that principles of
comity should be applied in deciding whether to give conclusive effect 14 1 to a
foreign country money judgment. 142 Unfortunately, the components of comity
were, and are, uncertain. 143 Thus, to avoid confusion, more definitive explana-
tions should perhaps be given by courts for the considerations that cause one
country's tribunals to recognize, or deny recognition to, another nation's
judgments. 144 Res judicata, the desire of all courts to put an end to litigation,
both domestic and international, is probably a more definitive and ap-
propriate term than is comity. 145 Full faith and credit, on the other hand, is
an unsatisfactory explanation because that constitutional clause is inapplica-
ble to extranational judgments. 146
137. 159 U.S. 113 (1895) (5-4 decision).
138. Id. at 227-28.
139. Id. at 205-06. The Court listed the elements of due process relevant to foreign money
judgment recognition: due allegations and proofs and the opportunity to defend against them,
proceedings operated according to the course of a civilized jurisprudence, and a clear and formal
record. Id.
140. Id. The French judgment in Hilton was refused recognition because, under principles
of international law and comity, reciprocity was lacking. Id. at 227-28.
141. To grant conclusive effect to a judgment is an expression of recognition of the judgment
without retrial of the merits.
142. 159 U.S. at 163-64.
143. At least one principle of comity, however, was discerned and applied by the Court. This
is the doctrine of reciprocity. Id. at 210; see notes 148-60 infra and accompanying text.
144. In Canada more or less definitive explanations have been given for the provincial courts'
willingness to recognize foreign country judgments. See note 25 supra.
145. Smit, supra note 6, at 52-56; cf. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 98,
comment b (1971).
146. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185 (1912). See also Smit, supra note 6, at
45-46. The clause's inapplicability has not prevented many American courts from applying
principles of interstate conflicts law to international litigation. See generally Ehrenzweig, In-
terstate and International Conflicts Law: A Plea for Segregation, 41 Minn. L. Rev. 717 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as International Conflicts Law]. Many courts fail to perceive that there should
be any difference. See, e.g., Ambatielos v. Foundation Co., 203 Misc. 470, 116 N.Y.S.2d 641
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The requirements of Hilton are quite similar to those of Canadian
courts. 147 One primary distinction between the rules of the two nations is in
the area of international law and comity, of which the primary component,
according to the American view expressed in Hilton, is reciprocity. 148 The
Canadians do not share this view because, as a common-law proposition, a
judgment from a foreign nation is not denied conclusive effect in Canada
merely because of lack of reciprocity. 149
In Hilton, however, conclusive effect was denied to a French judgment on
the ground that reciprocity was lacking, since France denied conclusive effect
to United States judgments. 150 Reciprocity seemed a reasonable approach, ' I
although only a bare majority of the Court approved it in Hilton. It is clear,
however, that the doctrine works hardship. 152 Thus, some federal courts have
questioned the requirement of reciprocity as a prerequisite to recognition. 1S3
Others considering the issue decide that reciprocity is needed, but are easily
able to find that it exists.' S4 Still others try to avoid the reciprocity issue by
holding that it must be raised by the judgment debtor as a defense. s'
(Sup. Ct. 1952). Others allow their familiarity with interstate conflicts law to control their
disposition of an international case. See, e.g., Compagnie Du Port de Rio de Janeiro v. Mead
Morrison Mfg. Co., 19 F.2d 163, 165-66 (D. Maine 1927); Neporany v. Kir, 5 App. Div. 2d 438,
173 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1st Dep't 1958), appeal dismissed, 7 App. Div. 2d 836, 184 N.Y.S.2d 559 (1st
Dep't 1959).
147. Among other prerequisites to recognition, provincial courts require the adjudicating
tribunal to have jurisdiction over the subject matter and person, to render a judgment untainted
by fraud, and to provide to the parties the Canadian counterpart of due process: natural justice.
See notes 28 & 97-109 supra and accompanying text.
148. "[I]nternational law is founded upon mutuality and reciprocity. 159 U.S. at 228.
See also id. at 210.
149. J.-G. Castel, Private International Law 259 (1960).
150. 159 U.S. at 227-28. The Court was explicit, however, in stating that reciprocity was not
required in the case of judgments in rem and quasi in rem. Id. at 166-68.
151. See, e.g., id. at 211-27 and authorities cited therein.
152. Although the Court in Hilton attempted to minimize the problem, id. at 228, automatic
denial of conclusive effect plainly causes injustice to one party (the judgment creditor) because of
actions in another country, by other parties, and beyond his control. Also, a requirement of
reciprocity only adds to the dilemma of nonrecognition of American judgments abroad. See R.
Leflar, American Conflicts Law § 74, at 171-72 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Leflar]. See generally
Nadelmann, Reprisals Against American Judgments?, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1184 (1952).
153. Foreign-Country Judgments, supra note 127, at 46-47 and cases cited therein. See also
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 98 (1971), where the rule for recognition of foreign
nation judgments is stated without mention of a reciprocity requirement. The comment to section
98 does deal with reciprocity, but in ambiguous terms: "There is a question whether consid-
erations of reciprocity are material." Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 95. comment e
(1971). One commentator has concluded that, in the current state of the law, reciprocity is
immaterial, and that "it seems regrettable that the Restatement (Second) did not more dearly
consign the reciprocity rule to oblivion." Peterson, Foreign Country Judgments and the Second
Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 220, 236 (1972) (italics omitted) [hereinafter
cited as Peterson].
154. See, e.g., the cases cited in note 135 supra.
155. E.g., Gull v. Constam, 105 F. Supp. 107, 109 (D. Colo. 1952).
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There is never any problem with reciprocity in the case of judgments from
Canada. 156 In Ritchie v. McMullen,'S7 a companion case to Hilton, the Court
held that Canadian judgments are entitled to conclusive effect, on the basis of
reciprocity, because Canada would grant conclusive effect to similar Amer-
ican judgments.' 58 The latter proposition is generally true, if, as in Ritchie,
the case involves a foreign judgment rendered by a court possessing territorial
jurisdiction.15 9 However, American courts should be cognizant of the fact
that, in certain situations and in certain Canadian provinces, conclusive effect
is not afforded to foreign judgments, even if the adjudicating court has
territorial jurisdiction. 160 In cases where reciprocity is required, this knowl-
edge may alter what would otherwise be a finding of reciprocity.
A federal district court case, Cherun v. Frishman,16' is a clear example of
the procedure, under federal common law, followed in an action for recogni-
tion of a Canadian judgment. The judgment debtor (Frishman) defaulted on a
mortgage executed in the District of Columbia upon property in Ontario. The
judgment creditor (Cherun) sued Frishman in Ontario, requesting foreclosure
and a money judgment. Frishman was served with process in the District of
Columbia pursuant to Ontario's long-arm statute. 162 He failed to appear and
a default judgment was entered against him. After further proceedings in
which the amount of the debt was fixed, Cherun sued upon the money portion
of the judgment in federal court. 63
The court first stated that the case was governed by the principles of Hilton
v. Guyot, including the requirement of reciprocity. The reciprocity hurdle was
easily surmounted because Canada is thought to be a reciprocating nation. 164
Since there was no controversy as to due process, subject matter jurisdiction,
fraud or prejudice, the Canadian court's personal jurisdiction over the defen-
dant was the only other condition of Hilton left to be considered.
In its evaluation of the in personam jurisdiction of the Ontario tribunal, the
Cherun court first undertook an investigation of the competence of the
provincial court to assert jurisdiction under Ontario's long-arm statute. This
156. E.g., Harrison v. Triplex Gold Mines, Ltd., 33 F.2d 667, 671 (1st Cir. 1929); Toronto-
Dominion Bank v. Hall, 367 F. Supp. 1009, 1012 (E.D. Ark. 1973) (dictum); Cherun v.
Frishman, 236 F. Supp. 292, 294 (D.D.C. 1964); Flota Maritima Browning de Cuba, S.A. v.
Motor Vessel Ciudad de la Habana, 218 F. Supp. 938, 942 (D. Md. 1963), aff'd, 335 F.2d 619
(4th Cir. 1964) (prior Canadian judgment denied res judicata effect).
157. 159 U.S. 235 (1895).
158. Id. at 242-43.
159. See note 93 supra.
160. Id.
161. 236 F. Supp. 292 (D.D.C. 1964), noted in 53 Geo. L.J. 1142 (1965) and 40 Wash. L.
Rev. 911 (1965).
162. 236 F. Supp. at 293. The court noted that the proceedings afforded Frishman full notice
and an opportunity to be heard. Id.
163. Id. at 293-94.
164. See id. at 294; notes 156-60 supra and accompanying text.
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step, which would not have been taken by a Canadian court,16s resulted in a
finding that the Ontario court acted within its own law.166
Next, the court raised the issue of whether, under principles of interna-
tional law, the assumption of jurisdiction by the Ontario tribunal under its
long-arm statute was a proper exercise of judicial power. 67 According to the
court, this determination was to be made with reference to American, not
Canadian, notions of due process in the area of jurisdiction. 68 The court
applied the current standard of due process in this area-the "minimum
contacts" doctrine' 69-a concept significantly more liberal than jurisdiction
based upon territoriality. 170 In Cherun, long-arm jurisdiction was acknowl-
edged, even though the United States defendant's contact with Ontario
consisted solely of ownership of land there and execution in the District of
Columbia of a contract affecting that land. 7 1 Neither contact, according to
Canadian courts, is sufficient for territorial jurisdiction.' 72
One final point from Cherun v. Frishinan is in order. The "minimum
165. In Canada, competence of a foreign court under its own law is, as a common-law
proposition, generally considered unimportant. See note 116 supra and accompanying text.
166. 236 F. Supp. at 295.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 295-96; see Foreign-Country Judgments, supra note 127, at 48-49; Reese, supra
note 14, at 789. Canadian tribunals make a similar evaluation of a foreign court's jurisdictional
base when they decide if, according to the law of Canada, the foreign court possesses jurisdiction
in the international sense. See text accompanying notes 31-41 supra. However, the similarity ends
there. See note 170 infra.
169. 236 F. Supp. at 297. The doctrine originated in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
170. While Canadian courts strictly and narrowly confine acceptable jurisdictional bases to
those of territoriality and physical power (to the virtual exclusion of all forms of modern statutory
jurisdiction), see part II-A(1) supra, American courts have abandoned such a policy. Cherun v.
Frishman, 236 F. Supp. at 296-97; Foreign-Country Judgments, supra note 127, at 52-54; see
note 74 supra.
171. 236 F. Supp. at 298. "[Defendant] should not now be allowed to avoid the consequences
of his failure to live up to that agreement solely on the ground that he was not physically present
in Ontario when suit was brought therein." Id. It is submitted that this is both correct and a
modern disposition of the personal jurisdiction issue of recognition of foreign country money
judgments.
Cherun v. Frishman stands for allowing recognition of a Canadian judgment, although
rendered by a court exercising mere long-arm jurisdiction. It has been held that, for long-arm
jurisdiction to be adequate, the Canadian statute must require that notice be sent directly to the
defendant. Boivin v. Talcott, 102 F. Supp. 979, 981 (N.D. Ohio 1951). It is insufficient that the
statute merely allows or suggests such notice. See id. This is reminiscent of the standards set for
American state long-arm statutes. See Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928). The requirement
should pose no problem for modern Canadian jurisdictional statutes, since they typically require
that notice be mailed to the defendant or that the defendant be personally served. See, e.g., Hwy.
Traf. Act, Ont. Rev. Stat. c. 202, § 134 (1970) (allows service upon the Registrar of Motor
Vehicles if a copy is mailed to the defendant); note 68 supra.
172. See note 41 supra.
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contacts" doctrine primarily applies as a limitation upon the exercise of
jurisdiction by an adjudicating state court over a nonresident defendant. 7 3
By using the doctrine in the related situation (by a recognizing court when
appraising a foreign court's assertion of jurisdiction), 174 the Cherun court
avoided the disconcerting double standard of Canadian courts.175 In other
words, the court in Cherun deemed it only fair to acknowledge in Canadian
tribunals the same level of jurisdiction claimed by American courts.176 It is
submitted that this is a farsighted approach. 177
173. This was the use of the doctrine in the case of its genesis. See International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
174. "Though . . . concerned with the permissible limits of jurisdiction of a state of the
United States over a nonresident defendant under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, this Court feels that the ["minimum contacts" doctrine applies] equally as well [in
this] present international context . . . ." 236 F. Supp. at 298.
175. See notes 60-81 supra and accompanying text.
A question arises if it is proper, in international litigation, to use the "minimum contacts"
doctrine, a concept "established by and for American courts [for use in interstate litigation] and
conditioned upon the peculiar history and functions of American concepts of jurisdiction .... "
International Conflicts Law, supra note 146, at 725. It is submitted that, since the "minimum
contacts" concept is at least as reasonable as the common-law requirement of territorial jurisdic-
tion, and is more in tune with today's world, assimilation of the concept into American
international conflicts law is both reasonable and a step forward. The common-law rule was
created expressly for extranational judgments; the minimum contacts rule can be adapted for that
role.
176. Ironically, the District of Columbia's jurisdictional statutes at the time provided for
personal service within the District, or service outside the District only upon a resident, 40 Wash.
L. Rev. 911, 914 (1965). Thus, the Canadian court was afforded greater power than the federal
court itself could claim. The principle illustrated is that the jurisdictional base asserted by a
Canadian court must comport with American standards of due process, although it need not be
cognizable per se under American law. See Reese, supra note 14, at 789-90 n.36.
The principle applies in Canada as well, where some jurisdictional bases potentially are
encompassed by the concept of territorial jurisdiction, but, at the same time, are not asserted by
Canadian courts. Cf. note 58 supra (foreign court's lack of jurisdiction under its own law is
unimportant, so long as it is in accord with notions of jurisdiction in the international sense). The
reality is, however, that territorial jurisdiction is significantly narrower than the jurisdictional
bases currently asserted by Canadian courts. See text accompanying notes 60-68 supra. The result
has been a double standard in Canada.
177. Cf. Leflar, supra note 152, at 172 n.7. See also Rzeszotarski v. Rzeszotarski, 296 A.2d
431, 437 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972).
A recent Nevada case directly applied the Cherun principle in an action seeking recognition of
a Canadian default judgment. Davidson & Co. v. Allen, 89 Nev. 126, 508 P.2d 6 (1973).
Defendant was personally served in Nevada pursuant to the British Columbia long-arm statute.
The court denied recognition, holding that the British Columbia tribunal lacked personal
jurisdiction because the defendant lacked "essential minimum contacts" with the province. Id. at
130, 508 P.2d at 8. In fact, said the court, defendants "had no contact whatsoever" with the
Canadian plaintiff. Id. The decision indicates that the mere fact that an American defendant Is
served under a Canadian long-arm statute, such service being satisfactory to Canadian au-
thorities, does not guarantee recognition. The judgment is recognized only if the statutory service
is justified by "essential minimum contacts" with the province.
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2. State Law in Federal Court
When subject matter jurisdiction is predicated upon diversity of citizenship,
rather than upon a federal question, a federal court is bound to decide a case
according to substantive state law, 178 including the conflicts law of the state
in which it sitS. 17 9
While no federal court has decided a diversity action involving recognition
of foreign country judgments without applying state law,18 0 it is clear that
this approach creates problems. For one thing, foreign policy considerations
may mandate the pre-emption of state law.' 8 1 Moreover, precedents in this
area are scarce. Many states have never spoken on the subject.'8 2 Others
have only ancient case law which may now be obsolete.' 83 Thus, it may be
difficult for a court to ascertain the conflicts law of the state where the
recognition action is brought. This must be done by federal courts in diversity
cases, and it poses a particular problem because federal courts cannot make
law for the states in which they sit. Except in the rare instance where a state
statute governing recognition exists, they can only follow existing precedent
or, where the case law is nonexistent or considered obsolete by the court,
"predict" what the law would be if contemporaneously decided by the state's
courts.' 84 This is often difficult and frequently risky, more so than in other
178. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). For an outline of the relevant state law in
this area, see part III-B infra.
179. Kaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 497 (1941).
180. Cf. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 98, comment e (1971); Peterson, supra
note 153, at 237. The alternative is for federal courts to apply federal common law, including
rules derived from Hilton v. Guyot, in all cases. But federal courts apparently consider Hilton to
be "a specific application of the principle of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842)." Foreign
Adjudications, supra note 77 at 1661 n. 192. Thus, after Erie, they have consistently applied state
law in diversity actions seeking recognition of foreign country money judgments. E.g., Somportex
Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1017 (1972); Svenska Handelsbanken v. Carlson, 258 F. Supp. 448, 450 (D. MLass. 1966).
The matter is not free from controversy, however. Even if state doctrines would normally control
in diversity actions, state law in the area of foreign judgment recognition may be pre-empted. See
note 181 infra and accompanying text; part III-C infra.
181. See, e.g., Foreign-Country Judgments, supra note 127, at 39-40; Reese, supra note 14, at
786-88; 8 Texas Int'l L.J. 247, 248 (1973). But see Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlan-
tique, 242 N.Y. 381, 386-87, 152 N.E. 121, 123 (1926).
182. E.g., Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Hall, 367 F. Supp. 1009, 1012 (E.D. Ark. 1973)
(Arkansas law). In addition, the following states appear to have no reported case law on the
subject: Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, and Wyoming. A recent
Oregon case, while not directly on point, applied the principles of comity from Hilton v. Guyot to
a divorce decree of an Indian tribal court, treated as a tribunal of a foreign nation. In re Marriage
of Red Fox, - Ore. App. -, 542 P.2d 918 (1975).
183. See, e.g., Svenska Handelsbanken v. Carlson, 258 F. Supp. 448, 450-51 (D. Mass.
1966), where the court looked to Massachusetts precedents dating from 1811 and 1813, the latest
cases on point.
184. See Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Hall, 367 F. Supp. 1009, 1012-14 (E.D. Ark. 1973). See
also C. Wright, Federal Courts § 58, at 268-71 (3d ed. 1976).
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diversity cases, in view of the dearth of case law in this branch of the law.
These difficulties suggest that an alternate approach is desirable."'8-
B. Recognition in State Court
As in federal practice, Hilton v. Guyot18 6 is the leading case in the area. 187
While it is said that Hilton is not binding on the states, 18 many have
followed it, holding that recognition is dependent upon considerations of
comity, 189 as the term is there defined. 190 Other states have rejected the
decision, at least insofar as it requires reciprocity as a prerequisite to recogni-
tion. 191 While comity is a term frequently used even in these latter cases, it is
probably more accurate to base a recognition decision upon principles of res
judicata. 192
A recent development has been the codification of state law, 193 with the
185. See part III-C infra.
186. 159 U.S. 113 (1895); see notes 137-60 supra and accompanying text.
187. State case law on the subject is surveyed in Foreign-Country Judgments, supra note 127,
at 45-72.
188. New York courts have flatly stated that Hilton is not binding on the states. E.g.,
Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 387, 152 N.E. 121, 123 (1926).
However, "[n]o definite answer to this fundamental question can be made at the present time,"
because it is unclear whether recognition of foreign country money judgments is a matter
"governed [in all cases] by national law." Reese, supra note 14, at 787; see part III-C infra. See
also Foreign-Country Judgments, supra note 127, at 46.
189. E.g., Northern Aluminum Co. v. Law, 157 Md. 641, 147 A. 715 (1929); Estate of
Alexandravicus, 83 N.J. Super. 303, 199 A.2d 662 (App. Div. 1964) (unclear if reciprocity is
required); In re Estate of Christoff, 411 Pa. 419, 422, 192 A.2d 737, 738 (1963), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 965 (1964).
190. See notes 40-49 supra and accompanying text.
191. New York was the first state to repudiate the doctrine of reciprocity, and has been
particularly outspoken on the subject. E.g., Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,
242 N.Y. 381, 152 N.E. 121 (1926); Cowans v. Ticonderoga Pulp and Paper Co., 219 App. Div.
120, 219 N.Y.S. 284, affd mem., 246 N.Y. 603, 159 N.E. 669 (1927). See also Ehrenzweig,
supra note 6, at 165. On the other hand, New York has followed the general rule of comity of
Hilton v. Guyot. E.g., International Firearms Co. v. Kingston Trust Co., 6 N.Y.2d 406, 411,
160 N.E.2d 656, 658, 189 N.Y.S.2d 911, 913-14 (1959). See also Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 544
F.2d 624, 629 (2d Cir. 1976) (New York law).
Reciprocity is a necessity in several other states. For example, New Hampshire has enacted a
statute which requires reciprocity for recognition of judgments from only one country: Canada.
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 524:11 (1974). The statute was enacted in retaliation against the drastic
limitations placed upon recognition of foreign judgments by Canadian courts. Foreign Adjudica-
tions, supra note 77, at 1662. For a survey of case law on the subject of reciprocity, see
Comment, The Present Status of the Doctrine of Hilton v. Guyot, 6 So. Texas L.J. 129 (1962).
192. See Bata v. Bata, 39 Del. Ch. 258, 275-90, 163 A.2d 493, 503-11 (1960), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 964 (1961) (Dutch judgment held to be neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel;
recognition thereby refused); text accompanying notes 144-45 supra.
193. For many years California had the only statute in the United States dealing with
recognition of foreign country judgments. Act of June 30, 1967, ch. 503, § 2, [19671 Cal. Stats.
1849 (repealed 1974). The statute was originally enacted in 1872 and amended in 1907 and again
in 1967. It has an interesting history; the 1907 amendment being traceable to the 1906 San
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exception of the reciprocity doctrine, into the Uniform Foreign Money-
Judgments Recognition Act (Uniform Act). 19 4 The Uniform Act, which will
be discussed in depth later, 195 applies only to money judgments and seeks
only to codify "rules that have long been applied by the majority of courts in
this country.' 1 9 6 Still, it makes a significant contribution to this subject since
it represents a current legislative mandate to the courts, and is a clear
statement of the law. To date, ten states have enacted versions closely
following the uniform text Alaska, California, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Oklahoma, and Washington. 97 While
they constitute a small minority of states, many of the enacting states are large
centers of international commerce.' 9 8
Although courts in states where the Uniform Act applies will probably base
their judgments in recognition actions primarily upon the act, litigants still
must examine relevant state precedents. This is because the Uniform Act
expressly does not prevent recognition in situations it does not cover. 199 These
situations should be relatively infrequent in view of its wide coverage.20 0
Nonetheless, where such situations arise, they are governed by state common
law. Courts will also look to state precedents for assistance in defining the
provisions of the Uniform Act. 20 ' Because nothing in the act contradicts this
Francisco earthquake and fire. Non-Recognition, supra note 11, at 252-53. The purpose of the
1907 amendment was to facilitate recognition in Germany of money judgments held by these
earthquake victims. 11 Cal. L. Revision Comm'n Rep. 473 (1973). Considered to be unnecessary
in the light of present legislation, see note 197 infra and accompanying text, the statute was
repealed in 1974. Act of May 2, 1974, ch. 211, § 6, [1974] Cal. Stats. 409, repealing Cal. Civ.
Proc. Code § 1915 (West 1955).
194. Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 242
(1962), reprinted in 13 Unif. Laws Ann. 269 (1975) [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as
Uniform Act]. The official text of the Uniform Act is set out in Appendix I infra.
195. See part IV infra.
196. Uniform Act, Commissioners' Prefatory Note. The statute is intended, in part, as a
message to those foreign countries which require reciprocity that American states are generally
hospitable to their judgments. Id. The hope is that they will reciprocate.
197. Alaska Stat. §§ 09.30. 100-. 180 (1973); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 1713-29 (West 1972), as
amended, (West Supp. 1976); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 110-1301 to -1308 (Supp. 1976); IIl. Ann. Stat.
ch. 77., §§ 121-29 (Smith-Hurd 1966); Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 10-701 to -709 (1974); Mass.
Ann. Laws. ch. 235, § 23A (Michie/Law. Co-op 1974); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 691.1151-
.1159 (1968); N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 5301-09 (McKinney Supp. 1976); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §§
710-19 (West Supp. 1976); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 6.40.010-.915 (Supp. 1975).
198. With respect to Canada, enactment by more states bordering on the Dominion would be
particularly desirable. It would facilitate recognition of Canadian judgments rendered against
residents of these border states upon liability incurred, for example, while travelling or doing
business in Canada.
199. Uniform Act § 7.
200. "This Act applies to any foreign judgment [as defined] that is final and conclusive las
defined] and enforceable where rendered even though an appeal therefrom is pending or it is
subject to appeal." Uniform Act § 2. See also Uniform Act § 5(b), authorizing courts to recognize
bases of jurisdiction other than those enumerated.
201. See, e.g., New Cent. Jute Mills Co. v. City Trade & Indus., Ltd., 65 Misc. 2d 653, 318
N.Y.S.2d 980 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
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case law,2 0 2 the latter serves to define the somewhat general provisions of the
act and to provide a point of departure in instances where a court concludes
that the act does not apply. 20 3 Thus, adoption of the Uniform Act is at once a
move to stabilize the case law by stating it succinctly, and a realization that
the common law will continue to develop.
C. Conclusion
So long as the cases in this area can be decided under state law, as the
majority are, a possibility is always present that fifty different approaches
may be taken. 20 4 While this is inevitable in any federal system, the interna-
tional implications in this area call for a consistency of approach. One
possibility is the adoption by all states and the federal government of the
Uniform Act. Although considerable progress has been made in this regard, 0-
enactment by many different legislatures is a time-consuming and uncertain
process. 206
A more expedient approach, and perhaps a preferable one, would be a
pronouncement by the Supreme Court that recognition of foreign country
money judgments is one of the "uniquely federal interests" to be governed in
all cases 20 7 by federal common law. 20 8 If held to be a federal interest, the law
would then be uniform because state and federal courts would be bound to
apply the federal doctrine, state law being pre-empted. 20 9 The step would
202. Kulzer, Recognition of Foreign Country Judgments in New York: The Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 18 Buffalo L. Rev. 1, 47 (1968).
203. The nonrestrictive nature of the act allows courts to proceed outside its provisions
whenever appropriate. See note 199 supra and accompanying text.
204. This has not been the experience to date. See notes 188-90 supra and accompanying text.
,205. See note 197 supra and accompanying text.
206. See generally P. Hay, Unification of Law in the United States: Uniform State Laws,
Treaties and Judicially Declared Federal Common Law, in J. Hazard & W. Wagner, Legal
Thought in the United States of America Under Contemporary Pressures 261, 262-65 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Hay].
207. Although the matter is in some doubt, the federal common law promulgated in Hilton v.
Guyot and its offspring is thought to bind only federal courts and, then, only in cases not
involving diversity. See notes 180 & 188 supra and accompanying text. Whether this national
judge-made law should control in all state and federal court actions seeking recognition of foreign
country money judgments is a question that can be definitively answered by the Supreme Court.
See Reese, supra note 14, at 786-88.
208. This step was taken by the Court in a case involving the act of state doctrine. Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426-27 (1964). At least one commentator suggests
that the act of state doctrine and foreign country judgment recognition both include analogous
political and legal considerations; thus, a uniform national law, applied in all cases, may be called
for. Scoles, Interstate and International Distinctions in Conflict of Laws in the United States, 54
Calif. L. Rev. 1599, 1607 (1966). See generally Goal-Oriented Approach, supra note 125, at
637-42. On the other hand, the political and legal propriety of this step has been questioned. See
id. at 642-45 (Supreme Court is ill-equipped to formulate policy in this area); Lenhoff, Reciproc-
ity, The Legal Aspect of a Perennial Idea, 49 Nw. U.L. Rev. 752, 762 (1955) (Supreme Court
does not control conflict of laws generally; should not prescribe recognition policies).
209. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426-27 (1964); C. Wright,
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have the immediate effect of making the relevant law readily ascertainable by
both American and foreign courts.2 1 0
There are, however, possible disadvantages to the extension of federal
common law to all recognition actions. Principally, it would mean that Hilton
v. Guyot and its requirement of reciprocity would govern. 2 " The drawbacks
of such an eventuality have previously been stated.2 12 In fact, the specter of a
requirement of reciprocity may explain the reluctance of some state courts to
adopt Hilton and its federal common law progeny as the standard in
recognition actions.
Still, if the reach of Hilton is extended, the possibility exists that the
advantages of uniformity will outweigh any disadvantages. Further, if the
reciprocity requirement is applied in all cases,21 3 the nation may actually
realize several benefits. 21 4
With respect to Canada, the effects of adoption of a uniform body of United
States law are uncertain. Under the present system Canadian judgments
generally fare well in United States courts. Nonetheless, it is conceivable that
provincial judgment creditors would prevail with greater frequency under
new rules favoring recognition, consistently applied, even in states currently
hostile to foreign judgments. Yet this improvement would not lead directly to
greater recognition of United States judgments in Canada, since the provinces
do not adhere to the doctrine of reciprocity. Thus, the relationship between
treatment received from, and afforded to, United States tribunals is tenuous
Federal Courts § 45, at 196 (3d ed. 1976); Hay, supra note 206, at 279-81. But see Foreign-
Country Judgments, supra note 127, at 40.
210. Readily ascertainable precedent is particularly desirable in those states which rarely
address this question.
211. Of course, even in cases where Hilton v. Guyot currently governs, many federal courts
find ways to avoid its effects. See notes 154-55 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, the
Court itself may decide to repudiate the doctrine by overruling a portion of the Hilton decision. In
any event, were the Court to find desirable the extension, in all instances, of federal common law
to the area of foreign country judgment recognition, the decision should be accompanied by a
clear statement as to whether reciprocity would be required. If required, lower courts should have
guidance on methods of determining which nations are reciprocating countries. The latter
involves delicate areas of foreign relations, where Supreme Court interference may be undesira-
ble. Thus, any authoritative federal action in this area may best be left to the executive and
legislative branches. See Goal-Oriented Approach, supra note 125, at 642-45.
212. See note 152 supra and accompanying text.
213. Where federal common law presently applies and it is conceded that reciprocity is the
general rule, courts have demanded it in only one class of cases. Reese. supra note 14. at 792.
Moreover, at least one commentator has stated that, since Hilton, not one judgment has been
refused recognition by an American court solely because of lack of reciprocity. Peterson, supra
note 153, at 235 n.96.
214. The benefits would include the facilitation of negotiations for treaties promoting mul-
tilateral enforcement of judgments, and, even without a treaty, greater recognition of American
judgments abroad because a uniform plan, rather than many divergent policies, would be better
understood by foreign nations. See Reese, supra note 14, at 793; Comment, Judgments Rendered
Abroad-State Law or Federal Law?, 12 Vill. L. Rev. 618, 628-30 (1967); 8 Texas Int'l L.J. 247
(1973). See also Non-Recognition, supra note 11, at 251-57.
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at best. The most that can be hoped for is that more favorable treatment of
Canadian judgments by American courts would encourage provincial tribun-
als to modernize their handling of this nation's judgments. 215 Alternatively,
the gesture may induce the executive and legislative branches of both gov-
ernments to equalize, by treaty or uniform legislation, the procedure sur-
rounding recognition of each other's judgments.
IV. THE CANADIAN AND AMERICAN UNIFORM ACTS: A COMPARISON
Because any accord between Canada and the United States on the subject
of recognition of judgments may take the form of uniform legislation, 2 16 it is
important to determine the compatibility of the Canadian Act 2 17 and the
Uniform Act.2 18 The consistencies are apparent.
As their titles indicate, the Canadian Act is directed toward enforcement,
while the Uniform Act concentrates on recognition. The difference, however,
is more apparent than real. Admittedly, the Canadian Act has detailed
provisions governing enforcement by registration of the foreign judgment, 2 19
while the Uniform Act devotes only one sentence to the matter. But this
sentence provides that, if eligible, a judgment is to be enforced "in the same
manner as the judgment of a sister state which is entitled to full faith and
credit, '220 in other words, by registration of the judgment. 221 Thus, the
execution procedures of the Canadian Act and of the Uniform Act are
essentially identical.
The acts are also quite similar on the issue of recognition. The core of the
Uniform Act deals with recognition, 222 as does a sizable portion of the
Canadian Act.223 Both require that the foreign judgment be rendered by a
215. This would be accomplished by modernizing the common-law rules, at least with respect
to American decrees.
216. See note 125 supra and accompanying text.
217. See note 20 supra and notes 117-25 supra and accompanying text.
218. See notes 194-203 supra and accompanying text.
219. Canadian Act § 3(l)-3(8), 7.
220. Uniform Act § 3. Thus, the court is referred to another body of law to work execution of
the money judgment. The use of interstate full faith and credit law in the realm of foreign country
judgments has been criticized. E.g., Smit, supra note 6, at 45-46. The Uniform Act's limited use
of the law developed under the clause merits little objection, however, because the Act sets out
criteria for recognition independent of interstate law. It directs attention to the latter only for the
narrow purpose of execution.
221. A comment directs the court to the method of enforcement of the Uniform Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments Act of 1948. Uniform Act § 3, Comment. The method referred to Is
registration. Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (1948 Act) § 2; see R. Ginsburg,
Recognition and Execution of Foreign Civil Judgments and Arbitration Awards, in J. Hazard &
W. Wagner, Legal Thought in the United States Under Contemporary Pressures 237, 251-32 n.67
(1970) (questions method of enforcement). The emphasis of both the Canadian Act and the
Uniform Act is on recognition through enforcement, rather than through treatment of the
judgment as res judicata.
222. Uniform Act 33 1-7.
223. Canadian Act §§ 2, 3(6).
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court possessing jurisdiction over the person and subject matter,2 24 and
affording proceedings untainted by fraud. 22 S Moreover, both mandate that
the judgment be in accord with the public policy of the recognizing state or
province226 and no longer subject to an appeal. 22 7
With respect to personal jurisdiction, the facet which creates most of the
dilemma in this branch of the law, the acts are very much alike. Both acts
include, as acceptable jurisdictional bases, either personal service in the
foreign law district, 22 8  voluntary appearance or other submission,
'2 2 9
domicile, 230 or the transaction of business.2 3' In addition, the Uniform Act
allows jurisdictional bases other than those enumerated.2 32 The Canadian Act
implies provision for additional bases.2 33
The similarity continues in the area Canadians call natural justice. Both
acts require that the defendant be afforded notice and an opportunity to be
heard. 2
34
One difference between the acts is that the Canadian Act requires
reciprocity, 23S while the Uniform Act rejects the doctrine of Hilton v.
224. Canadian Act § 3(6)(a); Uniform Act §§ 4(a)(2)-(3). The Canadian Act clearly requires the
original court to possess jurisdiction under both its own law and the conflicts rules of the
enforcing province. This alters the common law. See note 165 supra. The Uniform Act, on the
other hand, does not specify the law under which the evaluation is to be made. The determina-
tion is left to case law. For one case dealing with this determination, see Cherun v Frishman,
236 F. Supp. 292, 295-96 (D.D.C. 1964) (evaluation made according to the rules of both the
original court and the recognizing court).
225. Canadian Act § 3(6)(d); Uniform Act § 4(b)(2).
226. Canadian Act § 3(6)(f); Uniform Act § 4(b)(3).
227. Canadian Act § 3(6)(e); Uniform Act § 6. The Uniform Act does not require automatic
denial of recognition of judgments subject to appeal. Rather, it provides for a discretionary stay of
the recognition action pending disposition of the appeal, or expiration of any time limits. Id.
228. See Canadian Act § 2(2); Uniform Act § 5(a)(1). Under the Canadian Act, personal
service under a long-arm statute outside the jurisdiction of the foreign court will not result in
automatic denial of recognition. Canadian Act § 2(2). This alters the common law. See part U-A(l)
supra.
The Uniform Act allows nonrecognition where jurisdiction is based solely on personal service,
and the foreign court is a "seriously inconvenient forum." Uniform Act § 4(bt6).
229. Canadian Act § 3(6)(b); Uniform Act §§ 5(a)(2)-(3).
230. Canadian Act § 3(6)(b) ("ordinarily resident"); Uniform Act § 5(a)(4) ("domiciled").
According to Canadian law, the concepts of ordinary residence and domicile are only similar, not
identical. See Williston & Rolls, supra note 38, at 333-37.
231. Canadian Act § 3(6)(b); Uniform Act §§ 5(a)(4)-5). The Uniform Act authorizes an
additional base of jurisdiction: operation of a motor vehicle or airplane within the foreign state.
Uniform Act § 5(a)(6). For the Canadian common-law approach to motor vehicle operation, see
notes 56-57 supra and accompanying text.
232. Uniform Act § 5(b).
233. See Canadian Act § 3(6)(a)(i), where the Canadian Act implies acceptance of any
jurisdictional base cognizable at common law.
234. See Canadian Act § 3(6)(c); Uniform Act §§ 4(a)(l), (b)(1).
235. "Where the Lieutenant-Governor in Council is satisfied that reciprocal provisions will be
made by a state in or outside Canada for the enforcement therein of judgments given in (name of
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Guyot 236 by omitting that requirement.237 While a reciprocity prerequisite in
the Canadian Act may be viewed as an unfortunate impediment to recogni-
tion, the practical effect should be minor. This is because, in all material
areas, the Uniform Act affords at least as much credit to foreign judgments as
does the Canadian Act. In this way the Uniform Act should effectively
establish reciprocity between the enacting states and the Canadian provinces.
Recognition in Canada should not be jeopardized on this ground.
The final comparison is the most enlightening. Both acts apply to money
judgments rendered by courts of foreign nations. 238 Thus, the Uniform Act is
available, in states that have enacted it, for use by judgment creditors seeking
recognition of Canadian judgments. The Canadian Act, on the other hand, is
beyond the reach of persons holding United States judgments because not a
single American state has qualified as a reciprocating jurisdiction. 239 This is
unfortunate because the preceding comparison would indicate that, even
under existing law, each state adopting the Uniform Act should qualify. This
being the case, the two acts could easily be harmonized with slight revisions
worked out in bilateral conferences. Yet, there will always be some differ-
ences in approach because, even under a bilateral uniform act, the underlying
systems of common law will remain distinct.240 Such adherence to national
legal traditions is to be expected, and even encouraged. But, with a uniform
act, disparities in treatment of each nation's judgments should be greatly
lessened. 24 1
Thus, while problems remain to be solved,2 4 2 it appears that the twin acts
are already well synchronized. The great bulk of work has been completed.
province), he may by order declare it to be a reciprocating state for the purposes of this Act."
Canadian Act § 12(1).
236. 159 U.S. 113 (1895); see notes 148-55 supra and accompanying text.
237. Foreign-Country judgments, supra note 127, at 47 n.51. However, in enacting its
version of the Uniform Act, Massachusetts added a requirement of reciprocity. Mass. Ann. Laws.
ch. 235, § 23A (Michie/Law. Co-op 1974).
238. Uniform Act §§ 1, 2. The Canadian Act potentially applies to judgments rendered
outside Canada, although only some provinces have so extended it. See note 120 supra.
239. See Appendix III infra.
240. That the bodies of common law will continue to flourish is apparent from an exam-
ination of the existing uniform laws. The Uniform Act does not thwart the development of state
case law. See notes 199-203 supra and accompanying text. Similarly, under the Canadian Act,
provincial conflicts precedent still has impact because that legislation makes enforcement subject
to any defenses that could be raised in a common-law recognition action. See Canadian Act §
3(6)(g); Recognition, supra note 13, at 143 & n.494.
241. The disparity results from the application of differing, and often outdated, common-law
rules. Widespread adoption of uniform statutes, representing a legislative statement favoring
recognition, should serve to counteract some of the more restrictive of these rules. Cf. Quebec
Judgments, supra note 7, at 142, praising the Canadian Act: "[it] take[s] into account the very
nature of a foreign judgment. [It] acknowledge[s] the fact that litigation has already taken place
abroad and that the enforcing court is not a court of appeal for the dissatisfied foreign judgment
debtor."
242. While the language of the acts is similar, the differences should be eliminated in order to




For decades, the United States and Canada have maintained a remarkable
relationship. Their vast common frontier, mutual heritage and longtime
friendship are circumstances that have spawned a kinship that can only be
characterized as unique. Yet despite the affinity, Canada's legal system is a
mystery to many Americans. This Comment has attempted to ascertain
whether the general similarity between the countries is reflected in the
procedures for recognition of each other's money judgments.
Several dissimilarities exist. For one thing an American judgment creditor
experiences greater difficulty gaining recognition in Canada than does a
Canadian in the United States. This is largely caused by different personal
jurisdiction requirements. The Canadian plaintiff in Cherun v. Frishman2 43
was successful against an American defendant because the district court
acknowledged the Ontario court's power over the defendant, even though
founded solely upon an Ontario statute. In short, the American court was
willing to afford to the Canadian court bases of jurisdiction similar to those
asserted by United States tribunals. The court applied modern standards of
jurisdiction to give credit to the Ontario tribunal and to its judgment.
The American plaintiff in Gyonyor v. Sanjenko24 4 was not so fortunate. He
sought compensation for his personal injuries against a Canadian defendant,
but was rebuffed by the Alberta court. Recognition of his Montana judgment
was denied because the Montana court possessed only statutory jurisdiction
over the Canadian defendant. Although the Alberta court enjoyed similar
statutory jurisdiction, it felt constrained by nineteenth century precedent and
was unwilling to apply modern jurisdictional standards. Thus, credit was
refused to the Montana tribunal and to its judgment. If Mr. Gyonyor desired
or needed compensation for his loss he would have to begin all over again in
Alberta.
This situation is regrettable. Yet, reason for optimism exists because many
of the similarities between the two nations extend to this area of the law.2 4S
Under each nation's common law several of the prerequisites to recognition
are alike. Moreover, the latest statements of the law-the uniform acts of
Canada and of the United States-continue the similarity and add a further
dimension: the acts demonstrate that the current thinking in each nation is
virtually the same. Thus, even in the troublesome area of personal jurisdic-
tion, the gap in outlook has been narrowed appreciably. Further progress is
required, for the doctrine of territoriality persists in Canada. It should be
noted, however, that the recent Canadian rules on the subject of personal
jurisdiction indicate meaningful change. For example, under provincial com-
will be obtained only if a significant percentage of the jurisdictions adopt it, all states and
provinces should be encouraged to enact the law.
243. See notes 161-77 supra and accompanying text.
244. See notes 65-68 supra and accompanying text.
245. Because the law dealt with here is that of two autonomous nations, the similarities
naturally will not approach absolute likeness. Nevertheless, the resemblance would indicate that
the two legal systems are not nearly as far apart as might otherwise have been supposed.
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mon law, statutory jurisdiction was unquestionably insufficient by itself to
justify recognition. 246 Yet the Canadian Act does not on its face mandate
denial of recognition in such situations. 247 This is a modernization which
might open the door to recognition of countless United States judgments, if
only the Canadian Act were available to American judgments.
The optimum solution to the problem of nonrecognition may be synchroni-
zation and adoption of the uniform acts by all provinces and states. Uniform
legislation is particularly appropriate for these two nations since, under the
present system, each province and state usually formulates the law to be
applied when a judgment is presented for recognition within its jurisdiction.
The disadvantage of this approach is the difficulty in gaining acceptance of
one piece of legislation by some sixty-four jurisdictions, while keeping the law
substantially uniform.
Another possibility is the negotiation of a bilateral or multilateral treaty
between the two federal governments. 248 A bilateral treaty may be more
expedient than a multilateral because many issues have already been resolved,
albeit independently, by the committees on uniform laws of Canada and the
United States.
Alternatively, the courts of the two nations could take action. In Canada,
where the rules of personal jurisdiction create difficulties, action by the
provincial courts could take the form of adoption of the doctrine of reciprocity
of jurisdiction. In the United States, where an absence of uniformity among
state laws contributes to nonrecognition of American judgments abroad, the
action taken might be formulation by the Supreme Court of a federal common
law rule to be universally applied. In either case serious consideration should
be given to the question of whether it is appropriate for the judiciary, rather
than the executive and the legislature, to work reforms in this area.
Whatever solution is preferable, it is hoped that the comparison presented
has clearly illustrated the large common ground shared by Canada and the
United States in the area of recognition of foreign money judgments. There
should be little difficulty gaining recognition of judgments on both sides of the
border because one common impediment to recognition-dissimilarity be-
tween legal systems-simply does not here exist.
Calls for rationalization of the law on this subject are not new. 24 9 Thus, it
would be naive to think that any dramatic changes will soon be forthcoming,
either from Canada or from the United States. 2-0 But the time has never been
246. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
247. See note 228 supra. However, insofar as the Canadian Act remains dependent upon the
traditional common-law rules, the present situation will continue unchanged.
248. Although treaties and conventions on this subject now exist, see, e.g., Canadian
Conflicts, supra note 10, at 561-67, Canada and the United States are not signatories to a
common agreement. See note 25 supra.
249. E.g., Non-Recognition, supra note 11, at 257-64.
250. A dramatic development, however, has recently come from the United Kingdom and the
United States. In London in October, 1976, after some five years of negotiation, representatives
of the two nations initialled the Convention between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
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more appropriate, and the foundation surely has been laid. The next step is
an understanding to be reached between friends.
Eric D. Ram
Northern Ireland and the United States of America Providing for the Reciprocal Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters. See Hay & Walker, The Proposed Recognition-of-
Judgments Convention Between the United States and the United Kingdom, 11 Texas Intl L.J.
421, 422-23 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Hay & Walker]. If formally adopted, the Convention will
be known as the "United KingdomlUnited States Civil Judgments Convention 197 . " See
October, 1976 text of the proposed Convention, art. 26 (not yet in force).
As the first United States accord on the subject of recognition and enforcement of foreign
country civil judgments, the proposed Convention is an ambitious endeavor. It goes further than
the Uniform Act and Canadian Act in several respects. Compare, e.g., Hay & Walker, supra at
426 (proposed convention applies to money and nonmoney judgments), with Uniform Act § 1(2)
(applies to money judgments only), and Canadian Act § 2(l)(a) (same). See also, e.g., Hay &
Walker, supra at 436 (acceptable bases of personal jurisdiction in tort actions broader under
proposed Convention than under Uniform Act). Another advantage of the Convention is that it
would bind all state courts, thereby promoting uniformity. Id. at 423. The Convention may
become a model for future recognition of judgment treaties between the United States and
countries such as Canada. See id.
APPENDIX I
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act (Uniform Act)*
[Be it enacted . .. .]
SECTION 1. [Definitions.] As used in this Act
(1) "foreign state" means any governmental unit other than the United States,
or any state, district, commonwealth, territory, insular possession there6f, or
the Panama Canal Zone, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or the
Ryukyu Islands;
(2) "foreign judgment" means any judgment of a foreign state granting or
denying recovery of a sum of money, other than a judgment for taxes, a fine or
other penalty, or a judgment for support in matrimonial or family matters.
SECTION 2. [Applicability.] This Act applies to any foreign judgment that is
final and conclusive and enforceable where rendered even though an appeal
therefrom is pending or it is subject to appeal.
SECTION 3. [Recognition and Enforcement.] Except as provided in section 4,
a foreign judgment meeting the requirements of section 2 is conclusive between
the parties to the extent that it grants or denies recovery of a sum of money. The
* Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 242
(1962), reprinted in 13 Unif. Laws Ann. 269 (1975).
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foreign judgment is enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of a sister
state which is entitled to full faith and credit.
SECTION 4. [Grounds for Non-Recognition.]
(a) A foreign judgment is not conclusive if
(1) the judgment was rendered under a system which does not provide
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due
process of law;
(2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant;
or
(3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter.
(b) A foreign judgment need not be recognized if
(1) the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not receive
notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend;
(2) the judgment was obtained by fraud;
(3) the [cause of action) [claim for relief] on which the judgment is based is
repugnant to the public policy of this state;
(4) the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment;
(5) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement
between the parties under which the dispute in question was to be settled
otherwise than by proceedings in that court; or
(6) in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign
court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the trial of the action.
SECTION 5. [Personal Jurisdiction.]
(a) The foreign judgment shall not be refused recognition for lack of
personal jurisdiction if
(1) the defendant was served personally in the foreign state;
(2) the defendant voluntarily appeared in the proceedings, other than for
the purpose of protecting property seized or threatened with seizure in the
proceedings or of contesting the jurisdiction of the court over him;
(3) the defendant prior to the commencement of the proceedings had
agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign court with respect to the
subject matter involved;
(4) the defendant was domiciled in the foreign state when the proceedings
were instituted, or, being a body corporate had its principal place of busi-
ness, was incorporated, or had otherwise acquired corporate status, in the
foreign state;
(5) the defendant had a business office in the foreign state and the
proceedings in the foreign court involved a [cause of action] [claim for relief]
arising out of business done by the defendant through that office in the foreign
state; or
(6) the defendant operated a motor vehicle or airplane in the foreign state
and the proceedings involved a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising out of
such operation.
(b) The courts of this state may recognize other bases of jurisdiction.
SECTION 6. [Stay in Case of Appeal.] If the defendant satisfies the court
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either that an appeal is pending or that he is entitled and intends to appeal
from the foreign judgment, the court may stay the proceedings until the
appeal has been determined or until the expiration of a period of time
sufficient to enable the defendant to prosecute the appeal.
SECTION 7. [Saving Clause.] This Act does not prevent the recognition of a
foreign judgment in situations not covered by this Act.
SECTION 8. [Uniformity of Interpretation. ] This Act shall be so construed as
to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states
which enact it.
SECTION 9. [Short Title.] This Act may be cited as the Uniform Foreign
Money-judgments Recognition Act.




SECTION 11. [Time of Taking Effect.] This Act shall take effect ....
APPENDIX II
An Act to Facilitate The Reciprocal
Enforcement of Judgments (Canadian Act)*
HER MAJESTY, by and with the advice and consent of the Legislative
Assembly of the Province of ........ enacts as follows:
1. This Act may be cited as "The Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments
Act".
2.--(1) In this Act,
(a) "judgment" means a judgment or order of a court in a civil proceeding,
whether given or made before or after the commencement of this Act,
whereby a sum of money is made payable, and includes an award in an
arbitration proceeding if the award, under the law in force in the state where
it was made, has become enforceable in the same manner as a judgment
given by a courtin that state, but does notinclude an order for the periodical
payment of money as alimony or as maintenance for a wife or former wife or
reputed wife or a child or any other dependent of the person against
whom the order was made;
(b) "judgment creditor" means the person by whom the judgment was
obtained, and includes his executors, administrators, successors, and
assigns;
(c) "judgment debtor" means the person against whom the judgment was
* [1958] Proceedings of the Uniform Law Conference of Canada 90. as amended, [19621
Proceedings, at 108, as amended, [1967] Proceedings, at 22.
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given, and includes any person against whom the judgment is enforce-
able in the state in which it was given;
(d) "original court" in relation to a judgment means the court by which the
judgment was given;
(e) "registering court" in relation to a judgment means the court in which the
judgment is registered under this Act.
(2) All references in this Act to personal service mean actual delivery of the
process, notice, or other document, to be served, to the person to be served
therewith personally; and service shall not be held not to be personal service
merely because the service is effected outside the state of the original court.
3.-(1) Where a judgment has been given in a court in a reciprocating state,
the judgment creditor may apply to the ................. .Court (name
of appropriate court in province) within six years after the date of the
judgment to have the judgment registered in that court, and on any such
application the court may order the judgment to be registered.
(2) An order for registration under this Act may be made ex parte in any
case in which the judgment debtor,
(a) was personally served with process in the original action; or
(b) though not personally served, appeared or defended, or attorned or
otherwise submitted to the jurisdiction of the original court,
and in which, under the law in force in the state where the judgment was
made, the time within which an appeal may be made against the judgment
has expired and no appeal is pending or an appeal has been made and has
been disposed of.
(3) In a case to which subsection (2) applies, the application shall be
accompanied by a certificate issued from the original court and under its seal
and signed by a judge thereof or the clerk thereof.
(4) The certificate shall be in the form set out in the Schedule, or to the like
effect, and shall set forth the particulars as to the matters therein mentioned.
(5) In a case to which subsection (2) does not apply, such notice of the
application for the order as is required by the rules or as the judge deems
sufficient shall be given to the judgment debtor.
(6) No order for registration shall be made if the court to which application
for registration is made is satisfied that,
(a) the original court acted either
(i) without jurisdiction under the conflict-of-laws rules of the court to
which application is made, or
(ii) without authority, under the law in force in the state where the
judgment was made, to adjudicate concerning the cause of action or
subject matter that resulted in the judgment or concerning the person
of the judgment debtor; or
(b) the judgment debtor, being a person who was neither carrying on busi-
ness nor ordinarily resident within the state of the original court, did not
voluntarily appear or otherwise submit during the proceedings to the
jurisdiction of that court; or
1500 [Vol. 45
FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS
(c) the judgment debtor, being the defendant in the proceedings, was not
duly served with the process of the original court and did not appear,
notwithstanding that he was ordinarily resident or was carrying on
business within the state of that court or had agreed to submit to the
jurisdiction of that court; or
(d) the judgment was obtained by fraud; or
(e) an appeal is pending or the time within which an appeal may be taken
has not expired; or
(f) the judgment was in respect of a cause of action that for reasons of public
policy or for some similar reason would not have been entertained by the
registering court; or
(g) the judgment debtor would have a good defence if an action were brought
on the judgment.
(7) Registration may be effected by filing the order and an exemplification or
a certified copy of the judgment with the (proper officer) of the court in which
the order was made, whereupon the judgment shall be entered as a judgment of
that court.
(8) If a judgment contains provisions by which a sum of money is made
payable and also contains provisions with respect to other matters, such judg-
ment may be registered under this Act in respect of those provisions thereof by
which a sum of money is made payable, but may not be so registered in respect
of any other provisions therein contained.
4. Where the original court is a court in the Province (or Territory) of
.................... (insert name of enacting province or territory) that
court has jurisdiction to issue a certificate for the purposes of registration of a
judgment in a reciprocating state.
5. Where a judgment sought to be registered under this Act makes payable
a sum of money expressed in a currency other than the currency of Canada, the
registering court, or, where that court is the (Supreme) Court, the (registrar) of
that court, shall determine the equivalent of that sum in the currency of
Canada on the basis of the rate of exchange prevailing at the date of the
judgment in the original court, as ascertained from any branch of any chartered
bank; and the registering court or the (registrar), as the case may be, shall
certify on the order for registration the sum so determined expressed in the
currency of Canada; and, upon its registration, the judgment shall be deemed
to be a judgment for the sum so certified.
6. Where a judgment sought to be registered under this Act is in a language
other than the (English) language, the judgment or the exemplification or
certified copy thereof, as the case may be, shall have attached thereto for all
purposes of this Act a translation in the (English) language approved by the
court, and upon such approval being given the judgment shall be deemed to be
in the (English) language.
7. Where a judgment is registered under this Act,
(a) the judgment, from the date of the registration, is of the same force and
effect as if it had been a judgment given (or entered) originally in the
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registering court on the date of the registration and proceedings may be
taken thereon accordingly, except that where the registration is made
pursuant to an ex parte order, no sale or other disposition of any
property of the judgment debtor shall be made under the judgment
before the expiration of the period fixed by clause (b) of subsection (1) of
section 8 or such further period as the registering court may order;
(b) the registering court has the same control and jurisdiction over the
judgment as it has over judgments given by itself; and
(c) the reasonable costs of and incidental to the registration of the judg-
ment, including the costs of obtaining an exemplification or certified
copy thereof from the original court and of the application for registra-
tion, are recoverable in like manner as if they were sums payable under
the judgment if such costs are taxed by the proper officer of the
registering court and his certificate thereof is endorsed on the order for
registration.
8.--(1) Where a judgment is registered pursuant to an ex parte order,
(a) within one month after the registration or within such further period as
the registering court may at any time order, notice of the registration
shall be served upon the judgment debtor in the same manner as a (writ
of summons or statement of claim) is required to be served; and
(b) the judgment debtor, within one month after he has had notice of the
registration, may apply to the registering court to have the registration
set aside.
(2) On such an application the court may set aside the registration upon
any of the grounds mentioned in subsection (6) of section 3 and upon such
terms as the court thinks fit.
9.--(1) At the time of, or after, making an application under section 3, the
applicant may further apply, ex parte, to the registering court for an order
that all debts, obligations, and liabilities owing, payable, or accruing due to
the judgment debtor from such person as may be named in the application be
attached.
(2) A judge of the registering court, upon considering the application for
registration of the judgment and the certificate of the original court accom-
panying it, and upon production of such further evidence as he may require,
may, if he deems it proper, make the order mentioned in subsection (1); and
the order when made shall be deemed to be a garnishment order before
judgment, and the rules of the registering court with respect to such garnish-
ment order shall apply thereto.
10. Rules of court may be made respecting the practice and procedure,
including costs, in proceedings under this Act; and, until rules are made under
this section, the rules of the registering court, including rules as to costs,
mutatis mutandis, apply. (This section to be changed to suit the rule-making
procedures in the province.)
11. Subject to the rules of court, any of the powers conferred by this Act
on a court may be exercised by a judge of that court.
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12.--(1) Where the Lieutenant-Governor in Council is satisfied that recip-
rocal provisions will be made by a state in or outside Canada for the
enforcement therein of judgments given in (name of province), he may by
order declare it to be a reciprocating state for the purposes of this Act.
(2) The Lieutenant-Governor in Council may revoke any order made under
subsection (1) and thereupon the state with respect to which the order was
made ceases to be a reciprocating state for the purposes of this Act.
13. Nothing in this Act deprives a judgment creditor of the right to bring
action on his judgment, or on the original cause of action,
(a) after proceedings have been taken under this Act; or
(b) instead of proceeding under this Act,
and the taking of proceedings under this Act, whether or not the judgment is
registered, does not deprive a judgment creditor of the right to bring action on
the judgment or on the original cause of action.
14. This Act shall be so interpreted as to effect its general purpose of
making uniform the law of the provinces that enact it.
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